237 F. Supp. 3d 1096
W.D. Wash.2017Background
- Monsanto (and successor entities) manufactured PCBs (Aroclor) as the sole U.S. producer until PCB manufacture was banned in 1979; Monsanto allegedly knew PCBs were toxic and prone to leaching but misrepresented those risks.
- PCBs are widespread contaminants in Seattle’s streets, storm drains, and the East and Lower Duwamish Waterways (Superfund sites); Seattle has spent and continues to spend money investigating and remediating contamination.
- Seattle sued (filed Jan. 25, 2016) seeking damages and equitable relief under theories of public nuisance, defective design, failure to warn, negligence, and equitable indemnity, alleging Monsanto should bear cleanup costs.
- Monsanto moved to dismiss arguing Washington’s Product Liability Act (WPLA) preempts common-law claims, claims are time-barred, or inadequately pleaded. Court considered pleadings and public documents incorporated by reference.
- The court held: product-design and failure-to-warn claims and equitable indemnity were dismissed; claims for public nuisance and negligence survived (not preempted or time-barred and sufficiently pled as to duty and proximate cause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption under WPLA | WPLA does not preempt claims based on Monsanto’s intentional conduct; many operative events predate WPLA (pre-1981) | WPLA preempts Seattle’s product-liability and negligence claims as product-related common-law remedies | WPLA does not preempt nuisance or indemnity (as pleaded); product-liability and negligence claims are within WPLA scope but are saved because "substantially all" events occurred before July 26, 1981 — claims not preempted here |
| Statute of limitations / timeliness | Municipal suit is for the public benefit and thus exempt from ordinary limitations periods under RCW 4.16.160 | Seattle had notice of contamination by 2000; claims filed in 2016 are time-barred | Seattle’s nuisance, products-liability, and negligence claims are filed for sovereign/public benefit (not time-barred); equitable indemnity is a proprietary/ private claim but was timely as it arises from a 2013 consent decree |
| Standing and scope of public-nuisance damages | Seattle (owner of property abutting waterways and operator of drainage systems) has standing and a special injury allowing damages | Monsanto contends Seattle lacks a property interest and thus cannot seek damages for public nuisance | Court finds Seattle has Article III standing and, as owner/operator abutting/connected to waterways, has special injury and may pursue nuisance damages |
| Proximate causation for nuisance | Monsanto’s sole-historic production, promotion, and ubiquity of PCBs plausibly link Monsanto to contamination and remediation costs | Monsanto argues other producers and third-party disposal break the causal chain | Court finds factual allegations sufficient for both cause-in-fact and legal causation; foreseeability and Monsanto’s knowledge support proximate causation |
| Product-liability (defective design / failure to warn) | Product defects and failure to warn caused waterways contamination and Seattle’s remediation costs | Seattle lacks standing because it is neither a user nor consumer of the products | Court dismisses these claims for lack of standing (strict products-liability extends only to users/consumers and certain household bystanders) |
| Equitable indemnity | Monsanto should indemnify Seattle for costs arising from regulatory consent decree because Monsanto caused contamination | Monsanto contends indemnity is abolished/ inapplicable and there is no relationship supporting full indemnity | Court dismisses indemnity claim: Seattle did not allege Monsanto is responsible for the entirety of liabilities such that full indemnity is warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state plausible claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (limits materials considered on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Wash. Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wash.2d 847 (WPLA preempts prior product-related common-law claims)
- Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 175 Wash.2d 402 (claims arising before WPLA effective date are not preempted)
- Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., 176 Wash.2d 555 (WPLA does not preempt intentional-conduct claims)
- Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677 (definition of intentional tort when actor foresees high probability of injury)
- Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wash.2d 165 (proximate causation and duty require policy balancing)
- Wuthrich v. King County, 185 Wash.2d 19 (cause-in-fact and legal causation elements)
- Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237 (elements of negligence and duty to those foreseeably harmed)
- Fortune View Condo. Ass'n v. Fortune Star Dev. Co., 151 Wash.2d 534 (equitable indemnity elements)