493 P.3d 94
Wash.2021Background
- Steven Long, who lived in his pickup truck, parked on City of Seattle property for over 72 hours and was cited under SMC 11.72.440(B); the truck was towed and impounded.
- Long told officers he lived in the truck and stored tools there; he could not move it because it was inoperable.
- At an impound hearing the magistrate found the parking infraction proved, waived the $44 ticket, reduced impound fees (from ~ $900 to $547.12), and imposed a $50/month payment plan; Long appealed.
- The superior court held the payment plan violated the homestead act and that the impoundment costs were unconstitutionally excessive under the federal Excessive Fines Clause, but it found the impoundment itself constitutional.
- The Court of Appeals invalidated the payment plan under the homestead act and rejected the excessive-fines challenge; the Washington Supreme Court granted review addressing the homestead, article I § 7, and excessive-fines issues.
- Holding: the Supreme Court held the truck was automatically a homestead under RCW 6.13.040(1) (no declaration required), but homestead protections had not been triggered because Seattle had not yet sought to collect; it held the impoundment and associated costs are "fines," an ability-to-pay inquiry is required, and the $547.12 payment plan was grossly disproportionate and therefore excessive; the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Long) | Defendant's Argument (Seattle) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether occupied personal property (a vehicle) must have a filed declaration to be an automatic homestead | RCW 6.13.040(1) automatically protects occupied personal property; no declaration needed | A declaration is required for "any other personal property" under the statute | Held for Long: occupied personal property is automatically protected under RCW 6.13.040(1); no declaration required |
| Whether the homestead act was violated by towing/impoundment or the payment plan (attachment/execution/forced sale) | Towing and threat of auction attached the homestead and payment plan coerced surrender of homestead protections | No attachment/execution/forced sale occurred because the city has not sought to collect; claim is premature | Held: homestead protection exists but did not yet apply because Seattle had not initiated collection/forced-sale procedures; Long’s homestead claim is premature (reversed superior court on homestead violation) |
| Whether impoundment violated article I, § 7 (privacy/home invasion) | City failed to consider alternatives and unreasonably deprived Long of his home | Impoundment was authorized by SMC 11.72.440 after notice; truck was inoperable so impoundment was reasonable | Held: claim generally waived on appeal; on merits impoundment was reasonable under Villela because officers had authority and alternatives were not available; no relief on § 7 claim |
| Whether the impoundment and assessed costs constitute an excessive fine under state/federal constitutions; and whether ability to pay must be considered | Impoundment and costs are punitive; ability to pay must be considered and here Long could not afford the $547.12 plan | The costs are remedial reimbursement (not punitive); a fine must be permanent to qualify; ability to pay is not central | Held for Long in part: impoundment/costs are at least partially punitive (thus "fines"); ability to pay is a required factor in proportionality; the $547.12 payment plan was grossly disproportionate to the offense and Long's means and therefore excessive — remand for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (civil sanctions with punitive aspects fall under the Excessive Fines Clause)
- Bajakajian v. United States, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (gross disproportionality is the constitutional test for excessive fines)
- Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states; historical context relevant)
- State v. Villela, 194 Wn.2d 451 (2019) (impoundment lawful only if officer reasonably determines no alternatives exist)
- State v. Clark, 124 Wn.2d 90 (1994) (analysis distinguishing remedial vs. punitive sanctions in excessiveness review)
- State v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 195 Wn.2d 442 (2020) (adopts proportionality factors for excessive-fines review)