City Of Seattle, V. Bill Lange
491 P.3d 156
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2021Background
- Lange was arrested for DUI after a pharmacy employee and responding officers observed signs of intoxication; officers obtained a blood warrant and WSP forensic scientist David Nguyen analyzed the sample.
- The City charged Lange with DUI and later added driving-without-interlock-device (IID) and driving with a suspended license (DWLS) charges; the City provided Nguyen’s blood-test report the morning jury selection began.
- Defense later obtained a WSP corrective action report showing Nguyen had caused at least one false positive in another case; neither WSP nor the City had disclosed that report in discovery.
- The municipal court suppressed the blood-test report as a discovery sanction under CrRLJ 4.7 for failure to disclose impeachment information; the court initially ordered the City to redact unrelated entries from Lange’s driving record (exhibit 13) but then threatened to admit it unredacted unless Lange stipulated to IID and DWLS elements.
- Facing the court’s threat while a jury awaited, Lange eventually stipulated and was convicted; the superior court denied the City’s writ challenging suppression and reversed Lange’s convictions on RALJ appeal for trial-court coercion and evidentiary error.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: (1) CrRLJ 4.7(d) requires prosecutors to seek and disclose discoverable impeachment material held by others and suppression is an available sanction under CrRLJ 4.7(g)(7)(i) without a separate showing of Brady materiality or prejudice; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by threatening to admit an unduly prejudicial, largely irrelevant driving record to coerce stipulations, requiring reversal of convictions.
Issues
| Issue | City (Plaintiff) Argument | Lange (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CrRLJ 4.7 authorized suppression of the blood report for undisclosed impeachment material | CrRLJ 4.7 obligations are limited to material in the City’s actual possession or control; suppression was beyond the rule | CrRLJ 4.7(a) makes impeachment information discoverable and 4.7(d) requires the prosecutor to seek discoverable materials from others; failure justified sanction | Court held CrRLJ 4.7(a) made the corrective report discoverable and 4.7(d) imposed a duty to seek it; suppression was an available discretionary sanction for the violation |
| Whether a showing of Brady materiality or prejudice is required to impose sanctions under CrRLJ 4.7(g)(7)(i) | Remedy required proof of prejudice or constitutional materiality before exclusion or other sanctions | CrRLJ 4.7(g)(7)(i) allows lesser sanctions (e.g., suppression) without a separate showing of Brady materiality or prejudice | Court held no separate showing of constitutional materiality or prejudice is required to impose sanctions short of dismissal under CrRLJ 4.7(g)(7)(i) |
| Whether Hutchinson’s multi-factor analysis applies before suppressing prosecution evidence for a discovery violation | Suppression is an extreme remedy and Hutchinson’s factors must be considered first | Hutchinson protects a defendant’s compulsory-process rights when sanctioning a defense witness; those concerns don’t apply to prosecutorial discovery sanctions | Court held Hutchinson factors were inapplicable here and not required before suppressing prosecution evidence for a discovery violation |
| Admissibility of unredacted driving-record abstract (exhibit 13) and denial of severance | Full driving record is foundational and relevant to IID and DWLS; admission and denial of severance were proper | Much of exhibit 13 was irrelevant or highly prejudicial to the DUI count; the court’s threat to admit it unredacted coerced stipulations and prejudiced Lange; severance motion was timely under the circumstances | Court held most of the record was irrelevant or unduly prejudicial to the DUI charge; the court abused its discretion by admitting the unredacted exhibit and by refusing to fairly consider severance, rendering Lange’s trial unfair |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999) (clarifying Brady materiality standard)
- Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1988) (compulsory-process considerations when excluding defense witnesses)
- State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772 (Wash. 1984) (CrR 4.7 requires disclosure beyond names/addresses; full discovery obligations)
- State v. Grieff, 141 Wn.2d 910 (Wash. 2000) (state violated CrR 4.7 by failing to disclose discoverable information)
- State v. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420 (Wash. 2017) (CrR 4.7(d) imposes a continuing obligation to seek discoverable information not in prosecutor’s control)
- State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863 (Wash. 1998) (exclusion of a defense witness is an extraordinary remedy; special analysis applies when defendant’s compulsory-process rights are implicated)