City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length
649 F.3d 1259
11th Cir.2011Background
- Lozman purchased the Defendant vessel in 2002 and used it as his residence at the City marina; it was towed to multiple locations prior to detention.
- The City marina entered a Wet-Slip/Dry Storage Agreement on March 10, 2006, charging a monthly dockage fee of $1,174.48; Lozman paid March 2006 in full.
- Lozman resisted the City’s redevelopment plans and prevailed in a 2007 state-court eviction suit, while continuing to dock at the marina.
- In 2007–2009 the City adopted new marina rules requiring insurance, registration, compliance with Clean Vessel Act, and other conditions; Lozman received multiple notices but did not sign a revised dockage agreement.
- On April 1, 2009 consent to Lozman’s occupancy was revoked for noncompliance; Lozman remained at the marina until arrest on April 20, 2009; the City filed in rem admiralty claims for trespass and for a maritime lien for dockage (necessaries).
- The district court held the Defendant was a ‘vessel’ under 1 U.S.C. § 3, awarded nominal damages for trespass, and awarded approximately $3,000 on the maritime lien; Lozman timely appealed all judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Defendant is a vessel under federal admiralty law | City contends the vessel is a transport-capable watercraft under §3 | Lozman argues it is a non-vessel residential structure | Yes, the Defendant is a vessel under §3 |
| Whether the City’s lien for dockage constitutes a maritime lien | Dockage qualifies as necessaries and supports a maritime lien | Disputes the amount owed and validity of the lien | Yes, the lien accrues and the district court’s amount finding was not clearly erroneous |
| Whether Lozman can support a First Amendment retaliation defense | retaliation evidence shows City acted because of Lozman’s speech | The timing shows retaliation, creating a material fact for trial | No, retaliation defense fails; summary judgment proper |
| Whether collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel apply to bar the admiralty action | State court findings should estop the admiralty action | Different issues and new factual predicates render estoppel inapplicable | No estoppel applied; district court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008) (vessel status depends on practical capability, not navigability or purpose)
- Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp., 221 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1955) (even with no propulsion, a craft can be a vessel if capable of being transported over water)
- 60' Houseboat, 390 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (houseboat moored at a marina still a vessel if capable of maritime movement by tow)
- Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 2010) (reaffirms broad vessel definition under §3; focus on practical transportation capability)
- Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (Supreme Court, 2005) (definitive test for vessel status: practical capability of transportation, not purpose)