City of Prattville v. S & M Concrete, LLC
151 So. 3d 295
Ala. Civ. App.2013Background
- Carter owned property in Prattville and operated S & M Concrete, LLC; he applied for a business license in Jan. 2008 listing that property as the business address, and the City denied the license because the parcel was zoned R-3 (single-family residential).
- Carter applied to rezone the property from R-3 to B-2 (general business) on Jan. 16, 2009; the Planning Commission and City Council held hearings and both denied the rezoning in May–July 2009.
- Carter obtained a TRO and then a preliminary injunction from the Autauga Circuit Court ordering the City to issue a business license and allow operations pending appeal; he later petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief and sought review of a denied BZA variance.
- At trial (ore tenus), the circuit court concluded the City had improperly changed the property’s zoning and found past nonconforming commercial use, judicially rezoned the parcel to B-2, and granted injunctive and declaratory relief; the City appealed.
- On appeal, the court examined whether (1) the City’s denial of rezoning was arbitrary and capricious under the fairly-debatable standard, (2) nonconforming use existed, and (3) the circuit court had jurisdiction over Carter’s untimely appeal from the BZA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether City acted arbitrarily/capriciously in denying rezoning (fairly-debatable standard) | Carter: denial was wrongful; City’s earlier issuance of a building permit and issuance history signaled approval of commercial use | City: denial was within legislative discretion; record supported R-3 classification and neighborhood opposition | Held: City’s denial satisfied the fairly-debatable test; not arbitrary or capricious — court should not substitute its judgment for municipal legislative action |
| Whether a continuing nonconforming commercial use existed permitting present commercial use without variance | Carter: predecessor used parcel as a gravel pit and use continued into the 1990s, supporting nonconforming-use protection | City: no competent proof of lawful, continuous use after 1993; nonconforming use discontinued for >1 year | Held: Carter failed to prove continuous nonconforming use after 1993; nonconforming use was discontinued and relief unavailable without a variance |
| Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear appeal from BZA's variance denial (timeliness under § 11‑52‑81) | Carter: amended appeal related back under Rule 15(c), making the BZA appeal timely | City: § 11‑52‑81’s 15‑day appeal period is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by Rule 15(c) | Held: 15‑day limit is jurisdictional; Carter’s amended appeal was untimely; circuit court lacked jurisdiction over BZA appeal |
| Whether City’s prior issuance of a building permit or earlier business licenses estopped enforcement of zoning | Carter: building-permit approval and past licensing put City on notice and estopped the City from denying use | City: equitable estoppel generally inapplicable against municipalities; building-permit approval did not override zoning ordinance | Held: Permit/ licensing did not estop the City; doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to municipal limitations in this context |
Key Cases Cited
- Pollard v. Unus Props., LLC, 902 So.2d 18 (Ala. 2004) (deference to trial court findings after ore tenus evidence; courts review legal questions de novo)
- Homewood Citizens Ass’n v. City of Homewood, 548 So.2d 142 (Ala. 1989) (zoning is legislative; challenger bears burden to show ordinance was not fairly debatable)
- American Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc. v. Fancher, 708 So.2d 129 (Ala. 1997) (explains the fairly-debatable standard and judicial deference in zoning matters)
- Byrd Cos. v. Jefferson County, 445 So.2d 239 (Ala. 1983) (affirming deference where rezoning decision satisfied fairly-debatable test)
- Fort Morgan Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Baldwin County Commission, 890 So.2d 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (standard that rezoning must be sound and fair; courts defer if fairly debatable)
- Mousseau v. City of Daphne Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 6 So.3d 544 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (burden to prove lawful, continuous nonconforming use existed at time ordinance enacted)
- Board of Adjustment of Town of Midland City v. Evans, 577 So.2d 471 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (15‑day appeal period for BZA decisions is jurisdictional)
- Lindsey v. Board of Adjustment, 358 So.2d 469 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (time limit for appealing zoning board decisions is jurisdictional and not governed by civil‑procedure relation‑back doctrines)
- Town of Stevenson v. Selby, 839 So.2d 647 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (invalid ordinance change when statutory notice requirements are not followed)