City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
29 A.3d 762
| Pa. | 2011Background
- Decedent, a Philadelphia firefighter from 1974 to 2003, died in 2004 from liver disease caused by hepatitis C.
- Decedent's widow filed a fatal claim petition under the Workers' Compensation Act in January 2005, seeking benefits and invoking the statutory presumption under §301(e).
- Hepatitis C is included as an occupational disease for firefighters under §108(m.1) of the Act, creating a rebuttable presumption of causation if the disease arises in the course of employment.
- At hearing, evidence included Meehan's testimony about on-scene exposure to blood and the historic 'sweep and scoop' protocol that increased contact with bodily fluids.
- Dr. Navarro treated Decedent and opined the hepatitis C most likely arose from occupational exposure, linking the disease to his firefighting duties.
- Dr. Gluckman, hired by Employer, opined Decedent acquired hepatitis C from intravenous drug use prior to employment, based on a 1971 note stating 'serum hepatitis from drug usage.'
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dr. Gluckman's causation opinion constitutes substantial competent evidence. | Kriebel argues Gluckman's opinion rests on unfounded assumptions with no factual predicate. | Kriebel contends Gluckman based his conclusion on records and medical reasoning admissible under Rule 703. | No; Gluckman's opinion is not competent evidence due to lack of factual predicate. |
| Whether reliance on a single 1971 note can support causation in the absence of corroborating records. | Kriebel asserts the note could be relied on, given medical expertise and absence of contrary records. | Gluckman relied on the note and ancillary data to form a causal link to intravenous drug use. | No; cannot bootstrap to prove causation without corroborating evidence. |
| Whether the presumption under §301(e) shifting the burden to Employer was rebutted by substantial competent evidence. | Kriebel argues Employer failed to rebut the presumption with competent evidence. | Employer contends Gluckman's opinion suffices as substantial competent evidence to rebut. | No; Employer failed to present substantial competent evidence to overcome the presumption. |
| What is the appropriate standard of review for an expert's opinion in rebutting the presumption of occupational disease causation. | Kriebel emphasizes rigorous competency requirements for expert causation testimony. | Employer urges deference to expert methodology and records relied upon. | Final standard is that expert testimony must be based on adequate, corroborated facts; mere conjecture fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gibson v. WCAB (Armco Stainless & Alloy Products), 861 A.2d 938 (Pa. 2004) (fatal claim burden and causation framework)
- Sites v. City of Philadelphia, 889 A.2d 129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (presumption of occupational disease; burden to rebut)
- Kelley v. WCAB (City of Wilkes-Barre), 725 A.2d 232 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (presumption rebuttable by substantial competent evidence)
- Collins v. Hand, 431 Pa. 378 (Pa. 1968) (expert opinion must be based on proven or assumed facts)
- Republic Steel Corp. v. WCAB (Shinsky), 492 Pa. 1 (Pa. 1980) (substantial evidence standard; medical proof must be reliable)
- Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639 (Pa. 1997) (expert reliance on records must be supported by record evidence)