City of Pasadena v. Super. Ct., B280805

Background

Sandra Jauregui was diagnosed with mesothelioma on or about September 25, 2015; complaint initially named many defendants but not the City of Pasadena.
On October 14, 2016 the Jaureguis filed a first amended complaint adding the City for dangerous condition of public property, alleging Sandra’s father worked as a City mechanic and tracked asbestos home.
The Jaureguis presented a government claim to the City on August 22, 2016 (about 11 months after diagnosis); no late-claim application was filed.
The City demurred, arguing the Government Claims Act required claim presentation within six months of accrual and that accrual occurred at diagnosis; trial court overruled the demurrer.
The City petitioned for writ of mandate; the Court of Appeal held accrual (for purposes of Gov. Code § 901) is the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered a compensable injury — here, no later than the diagnosis — and because the claim was presented more than six months after that date, the claim-presentation requirement was not met.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jauregui)	Defendant's Argument (City)	Held
What date controls "the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued" under Gov. Code § 901 for computing the six-month claim presentation deadline?	“Accrued” means commencement of the limitations period; under CCP § 340.2 the limitations period never began (Sandra never disabled), so accrual never occurred and claim presentation deadline never started.	Accrual means when the cause of action became actionable (ripeness); section 340.2 alters the limitations period but not accrual; accrual occurred by diagnosis.	Accrual for § 901 follows ordinary accrual/discovery rules: date plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered a compensable injury (here, by diagnosis).
Does CCP § 340.2 alter the Government Claims Act six-month presentation deadline by postponing accrual until "disability"?	§ 340.2’s delayed limitations should also delay accrual for claim-presentation purposes.	§ 340.2 changes only the limitations period start for filing suit, not the accrual date for claims presentation.	§ 340.2 does not change accrual for Gov. Code § 901; accrual remains discovery-based.
If accrual never occurs under plaintiff’s reading, can an asbestos plaintiff ever sue?	Plaintiff implies accrual never occurs for retirees/unemployed who never suffer statutory “disability.”	That reading would produce an absurd result (forever barred); accrual must be discovery-based.	Court rejects plaintiff’s interpretation as anomalous; accrual can occur upon discovery even if § 340.2’s disability never happens.
Does the Government Claims Act purpose support an unlimited claim-presentation period for asbestos claims?	Plaintiff urges § 340.2’s remedial purpose favors allowing late claim presentation until filing.	Allowing unlimited presentation would frustrate public entity notice, investigation, fiscal planning purposes.	Court enforces the six-month deadline measured from discovery to preserve public-entity notice/settlement purposes.

Key Cases Cited

City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730 (clarifies Government Claims Act notice purposes and review standard for claim-presentation demurrers)
Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 16 Cal.4th 520 (applies discovery rule to asbestos-related claims accrual)
Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., 22 Cal.4th 1127 (distinguishes accrual from the limitations-period start in § 340.2)
Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 51 Cal.4th 788 (defines accrual as when cause of action is complete with all elements and discusses discovery rule)
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal.4th 1185 (treats accrual and application of discovery rule where statute uses "accrued")
Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201 (holds revived statute of limitations did not override government claim-presentation requirement)
Barr v. Acands, Inc., 57 Cal.App.4th 1038 (rejects interpretation that asbestos claims cannot accrue absent disability under § 340.2)
Nelson v. Flintkote Co., 172 Cal.App.3d 727 (discusses characterization of § 340.2 as delayed-accrual rule)