City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
20 F.4th 441
9th Cir.2021Background
- Oakland sued the NFL and its 32 teams under §1 of the Sherman Act, alleging the league artificially limited team supply and controlled relocation to extract supracompetitive payments from host cities.
- The Raiders sought and received NFL approval to relocate to Las Vegas (31–1 vote); Oakland alleges it was "priced out" and lost the team, causing lost revenues, investment losses, and Coliseum devaluation.
- Oakland pressed two theories: (1) a group boycott (concerted refusal to deal with Oakland) and (2) a horizontal price‑fixing cartel restricting output and raising prices for host cities.
- The district court dismissed the Sherman Act claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and found Oakland’s asserted damages and causation speculative; it declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed: it rejected the group‑boycott theory (only one team refused to deal) and held the price‑fixing theory failed because Oakland, as a nonpurchaser "priced out" of the market, lacked antitrust standing—the causation and damages were too speculative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for antitrust claims | Oakland alleged concrete injury from losing the Raiders and plausible traceability to NFL rules; substantial probability Raiders would have stayed absent restrictions | Defendants argued Oakland's harm rests on an attenuated chain of speculation about hypothetical teams, entry, and offers | Court: Oakland adequately pled Article III standing generally (substantial‑probability standard) for some claims, but standing analysis still required for antitrust standing on price‑fixing theory |
| Group boycott (§1) | League and other teams collectively refused to deal with Oakland by enabling Raiders' relocation and blocking expansion/replacement | Defendants: only the Raiders refused to deal; other teams merely supported the move but did not individually refuse to do business with Oakland | Court: Dismissed group boycott claim—plaintiff alleged an individual boycott by the Raiders, not the plurality of independent refusals required for a group boycott |
| Horizontal price‑fixing / cartel liability | NFL’s ¾ approval rule and limits on expansion suppressed output, creating a cartel that raised prices for host cities and caused Oakland’s injuries | Defendants: Oakland is a nonpurchaser priced out of the market; its injury is indirect, speculative, and not the classic injury to direct purchasers who paid overcharges | Court: Price‑fixing theory fails for lack of antitrust standing—although antitrust injury was pleaded, the directness and damages factors weigh against allowing a nonpurchaser priced out of the market to recover |
| Pleading plausibility (Rule 12(b)(6)) | Oakland’s FAC alleged facts (market analysis, past dealings, city attractiveness) that make the chain of causation plausible | Defendants: allegations are too speculative to meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standards for a group boycott or to show a concrete, traceable injury for price‑fixing damages | Court: Under Twombly/Iqbal the group boycott allegations were implausible as pleaded; price‑fixing viable in theory but plaintiff lacked sufficiently certain causal and damages allegations, so dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (antitrust complaints must meet plausibility standard)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (Article III standing requirements)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements—injury, causation, redressability)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ("substantial probability" standard for showing causation in standing)
- FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (group boycott is a concerted refusal to serve a customer)
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978) (recognizing group boycott aimed at consumers)
- Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981) (nonpurchasers priced out of market face special standing problems)
- Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (attenuated causal chains undermine standing)
- NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (price and output restraints are paradigmatic antitrust harms)