City of Moline Acres v. Charles W. Brennan
470 S.W.3d 367
Mo.2015Background
- Moline Acres adopted an ordinance making vehicle owners liable if their vehicle is photographed exceeding the speed limit when operated with the owner’s permission; automated camera photo led to a Notice to Brennan for a 56 mph in a 45 mph zone.
- Notice demanded payment to the City (not to a court), stated payment would prevent referral for prosecution, and said no points would be assessed.
- Brennan pleaded not guilty, demanded jury trial, and moved to dismiss arguing the ordinance and Notice (a) conflict with state law on driver liability and points, (b) shift the burden of proof via an owner-equals-driver presumption, and (c) fail Rule 37.33 notice requirements and due process.
- The circuit court sustained the motion and dismissed the information with prejudice; the City appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal but on different grounds: the Notice failed to meet Rule 37.33 and effectuated an extra‑judicial payment/charging scheme inconsistent with required court-supervised procedures, so the information was not supported by a proper Rule 37.33 notice.
Issues
| Issue | Brennan's Argument | City (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ordinance conflicts with state speeding laws by making owners liable for speeding or by avoiding misdemeanor classification | Ordinance effectively punishes speeding and owner liability contradicts statutes that target drivers and classify speeding as a misdemeanor | Ordinance targets owners who permit others to speed (a different offense), so no conflict with state speeding statutes | No conflict with state speed statutes; ordinance regulates owner conduct (permitting), not speeding per se, so dismissal on that ground was erroneous |
| Whether the ordinance or Notice conflicts with state point-assessment statutes | Notice says no points; conflict with §302.302 requiring points for moving violations | Ordinance is silent on points; owner-liability is distinct and city argued points need not apply | Ordinance is silent so no direct conflict; but a conviction qualifies as a "moving violation" and points must be assessed administratively; the Notice’s statement that no points will be assessed is invalid |
| Whether the ordinance unconstitutionally shifts burden of proof via a rebuttable presumption (owner → permission/driver) | Ordinance presumes owner was driver or consented, shifting burden to defendant to prove otherwise; violates presumption‑of‑innocence limits | Any presumption is rebuttable and limited; City says inference of owner’s consent to general use is reasonable and aids proof of permission element | The ordinance’s inference that ownership alone permits drawing the specific inference owner consented to speeding is irrational and unconstitutional; City may not rely on that presumption to prove the permission element |
| Whether the Notice complied with Rule 37.33 and due process given payment demand and omission of court appearance facts | Notice failed to state court name/address/initial appearance date/time and failed to state facts showing probable cause that owner gave permission; demanding payment outside court violates Rule 37; thus information unsupported by required notice | City argued defects were waived because Brennan defended and that the ordinance/Notice need not mirror Rule 37 exactly; payments are civil penalties and part of enforcement | Notice did not comply with Rule 37.33(a) and Form 37.A: it omitted court appearance info and failed to state facts supporting probable cause on the permission element; demanding payment to City (outside court/violation‑bureau rules) subverted court process, so the information was invalid and dismissal with prejudice affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Page W., Inc. v. Community Fire Prot. Dist. of St. Louis County, 636 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1982) (local ordinance conflicts with state law only if it permits what statute prohibits or prohibits what statute permits)
- McCollum v. Dir. of Revenue, 906 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1995) (courts adopt reasonable construction to avoid conflict between local ordinance and state law)
- American Eagle Waste Indus., LLC v. St. Louis County, 379 S.W.3d 813 (Mo. 2012) (appellate review focuses on correctness of result not route; affirm if any cognizable theory supports judgment)
- City of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538 (Mo. 2015) (ordinance provision stating no points will be assessed is invalid where statute requires points for the offense)
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1979) (permissive presumptions that effectively shift burden on an element of a crime implicate due process/presumption of innocence)
- County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (U.S. 1979) (constitutional test for presumptions: rational connection or more‑likely‑than‑not standard)
- Damon v. City of Kansas City, 419 S.W.3d 162 (Mo. App. 2013) (criticizing owner‑equals‑driver rebuttable presumption in criminal context)
- Brunner v. City of Arnold, 427 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. App. 2013) (addressing constitutional limits on presumptions and whether ordinance is civil or criminal)
- City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1973) (upholding certain owner‑liability in parking context where a rational inference supports liability)
- City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1949) (upholding owner liability for parking where ownership sufficed to infer authorization)
- Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962) (permissive presumptions in civil cases require a rational connection between proved fact and presumed fact)