City of Missoula v. Leuchtman, 2017 MT 303N

Angela Miller obtained an Order of Protection (2015) requiring Stephen Leuchtman to stay 1,500 feet from her workplace at 350 Ryman Street, Missoula.
On Jan 27, 2016, Miller photographed Leuchtman after he drove past the entrance to 350 Ryman; Leuchtman said he drove by to avoid following her after visiting his attorney nearby.
Leuchtman was charged with Violation of an Order of Protection, pled not guilty, and was released on conditions including a 1,500-foot restriction and prohibitions on internet-capable phones after repeated violations.
He moved to dismiss for speedy trial and proposed a “choice of two evils” jury instruction; the municipal court denied both, and a jury convicted him. The district court affirmed on appeal; Leuchtman then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
On appeal to the Supreme Court Leuchtman raised (1) challenges to bond/release conditions and denial of access to counsel/courts, and (2) ineffective assistance claims for counsel’s failure to (a) move to dismiss on access-to-counsel grounds and (b) preserve or obtain the choice-of-evils jury instruction.
The Supreme Court declined to consider the new bond/release claims (procedurally barred) and rejected ineffective-assistance claims on the merits: record showed access to counsel continued and the choice-of-evils/compulsion theory was unsupported by the facts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were challenges to bond revocation/conditions of release properly before the Court?	City: issues were not raised earlier; procedural default.	Leuchtman: conditions were unreasonable and prejudiced his defense and access to courts.	Court: procedurally barred — not raised below, so not considered.
Did release conditions violate Leuchtman’s right to access counsel/courts?	City: conditions were lawful and did not bar access.	Leuchtman: restrictions (device/internet ban) prevented meaningful access and assistance.	Court: record shows he continued to access counsel; no prejudice shown.
Was counsel ineffective for not moving to dismiss based on denial of access to counsel?	City: counsel’s performance not deficient or prejudicial.	Leuchtman: counsel should have moved to dismiss as deprivation of access rendered the charge unconstitutional.	Court: ineffective-assistance claim fails — no deficient performance shown to have prejudiced defense.
Was counsel ineffective for failing to obtain a "choice of two evils" instruction?	City: instruction was inapplicable; statutory compulsion (§ 45-2-212, MCA) addressed similar defenses.	Leuchtman: trial counsel should have preserved and requested the instruction.	Court: instruction unjustified by facts; compulsion/choice-of-evils not supported; no prejudice — claim fails.

State v. Longfellow, 194 P.3d 694 (recognizing appellate waiver for issues not raised below)
State v. Lucero, 97 P.3d 1106 (ineffective assistance of counsel reviewed as mixed question of law and fact)
Whitlow v. State, 183 P.3d 861 (adopting Strickland two-part test in Montana)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing deficient performance and prejudice standard for ineffective assistance)
State v. Arlington, 875 P.2d 307 (trial court may reject jury instruction unsupported by law or facts)