249 So. 3d 709
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- In 2010 the City of Miami declared a financial urgency and unilaterally amended its pension ordinance, reducing benefits for police retirees (the 2010 pension ordinance).
- The Union filed unfair labor practice charges; PERC and the First DCA initially upheld the City, but the Florida Supreme Court in Headley rejected that interpretation and ruled unilateral changes under the financial urgency statute require completion of impasse procedures and a showing funds aren’t available from other sources.
- On remand PERC found the City violated impasse procedures, ordered rescission and reinstatement of the pre-2010 status quo, and opened a back-pay proceeding; PERC’s order was nonfinal and nonappealable pending back-pay determinations.
- The Board of Trustees, without a final PERC order invalidating the 2010 ordinance, directed the Trust Administrator to administer benefits as if the 2010 ordinance never passed and began paying restored benefits.
- The City sued the Board and Trust seeking injunctive relief to stop benefit payments and argued the Board lacked authority to act absent a final order; the trial court denied the City’s emergency injunction but abated the suit under Florida’s Governmental Conflict Resolution Act (Chapter 164).
- The district court reversed denial of the temporary injunction (holding the Board lacked authority to act while the ordinance remained in effect) and affirmed abatement pending exhaustion of Chapter 164 procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Headley or PERC’s remand order voided the 2010 pension ordinance so the Board could restore pre-2010 benefits | City: Headley did not invalidate the ordinance; PERC’s remand order was nonfinal, so the ordinance remained in effect and only the City (not the Board) may rescind or amend it | Board: Headley and PERC’s remand ruling rendered the 2010 ordinance void ab initio, requiring the Board to administer benefits as if it never passed | Held: Headley did not void the ordinance and PERC’s remand order was nonfinal; the Board lacked authority to unilaterally treat the ordinance as void and adjust benefits |
| Whether the City was entitled to a temporary injunction to stop the Board’s benefit changes | City: Injunction enforcing municipal police power; need not prove irreparable harm when enforcing ordinances; substantial likelihood on the limited merits that Board lacked authority | Board: City cannot show likelihood of success; exception for municipal police power does not apply here | Held: Trial court erred in denying injunction; because the City sought to enforce its ordinance (police power), the injunction standard is relaxed and the City was entitled to temporary injunctive relief |
| Whether the trial court properly abated the lawsuit under Chapter 164 when a governmental entity sues another | City: Board never properly invoked Chapter 164 because it did not pass a formal resolution; thus abatement was improper | Board: Chapter 164 mandates abatement whenever a governmental entity sues another; abatement required even if dispute-resolution steps not yet initiated | Held: Abatement was proper under §164.1041(1); courts must abate suits between governmental entities until Chapter 164 procedures are exhausted |
| Whether a governing board may amend plan provisions absent municipal approval or final invalidation of municipal ordinance | City: Board may not amend or ignore an ordinance absent municipal action or a final invalidating order | Board: Board acted appropriately after PERC’s remand determinations | Held: Board usurped the City’s authority; §185.06(4) and local ordinances reserve amendment authority to the municipality absent final invalidation |
Key Cases Cited
- Headley v. City of Miami, 215 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2017) (Florida Supreme Court: unilateral changes under the financial urgency statute require completion of impasse procedures and showing funds unavailable from other sources)
- Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017) (standard of review for temporary injunctions: de novo for legal conclusions and abuse of discretion for factual findings)
- Miami-Dade Cty. v. Fernandez, 905 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (when a government enforces its police power, irreparable harm and lack of alternative remedy need not be shown for injunctions)
- Metro. Dade Cty. v. O’Brien, 660 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (government injunctions enforcing police power presume irreparable harm)
- Manatee Cty. v. 1187 Upper James of Fla., LLC, 104 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (municipality entitled to injunction to enforce its duly enacted ordinance)