City of Lakewood v. Armstrong
2017 COA 159
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 1984 Lois Jones Mackey conveyed a recorded "permanent public easement for ingress and egress" over a portion of her property to Jefferson County; a month later Jefferson County conveyed that easement to the City of Lakewood (Commissioners deed) with a reverter clause limiting use to public open space, park, and recreational purposes.
- The Commissioners deed’s Exhibit A provided a metes-and-bounds description that matched the servient parcel; the deed did not separately describe a dominant estate and the easement’s precise location within the servient parcel was not specified.
- The Armstrongs purchased the servient parcel in 2011, later obstructed access, and the City sued (quiet title, declaratory relief, prescriptive easement, reformation, injunction). The district court granted Lakewood partial summary judgment declaring the easement valid and appurtenant to Lakewood/public use and denied the Armstrongs’ cross-motion.
- On appeal the Armstrongs argued the Commissioners deed failed the statute of frauds because it did not describe the easement or a dominant estate, that they lacked notice, that extrinsic evidence was improperly considered, that the reverter had been triggered, and that Jefferson County lacked authority to acquire the easement for Lakewood.
- The court held (de novo review) the deed was valid: the servient estate and easement were described with reasonable certainty, constructive notice existed, extrinsic evidence could be consulted to resolve vagueness and identify the dominant estate (Bear Creek Greenbelt), the reverter was not triggered, and Jefferson County had authority to acquire the easement for public park/open-space purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lakewood) | Defendant's Argument (Armstrongs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Commissioners deed satisfies the statute of frauds / describes the easement with reasonable certainty | Exhibit A adequately identifies the land burdened and thus the easement is sufficiently certain | Deed fails statute of frauds because it does not separately describe the easement or a dominant estate | Held: Valid — servient parcel and easement identified with reasonable certainty; lack of specific internal location not fatal |
| Whether absence of an expressly described dominant estate invalidates the easement appurtenant | Dominant estate need not be precisely described where servient tenement is accurately identified; extrinsic evidence shows the easement served the Bear Creek Greenbelt | Deed is invalid because no dominant estate is described, so no appurtenant easement | Held: Valid — lack of express dominant-estate description is not fatal; court may identify dominant estate by extrinsic evidence |
| Whether the Armstrongs had constructive notice of the recorded easement | The recorded deed put subsequent purchasers on constructive notice | Lack of a separate easement or dominant-estate description negates constructive notice | Held: Armstrongs had constructive notice; deed was recorded and sufficiently certain |
| Whether the Commissioners deed’s reverter clause was triggered by dominant estate zoning or other facts | The dominant estate (Bear Creek Greenbelt) has been continuously used for public open space/park purposes, so reverter not triggered | Reverter triggered because dominant estate is zoned commercial and/or is not adjacent | Held: Reverter not triggered — trigger depends on actual use (not zoning) and use remained public open space; adjacency not required |
| Whether extrinsic evidence could be considered to clarify vagueness/identify dominant estate | Court may consider undisputed extrinsic evidence to determine whether description is reasonably certain and to identify the dominant estate | Court improperly used extrinsic evidence to alter deed and fill gaps | Held: Permissible — extrinsic evidence may be used to resolve reasonable-certainty questions and identify the dominant estate |
| Whether Jefferson County had authority to purchase the easement for Lakewood’s/public use | County lawfully acquired the easement under its express and implied statutory powers to acquire park/open-space/public-project property | County lacked authority because it did not own adjacent land and could not acquire for another jurisdiction’s benefit | Held: Jefferson County had authority under statutes and implied powers to acquire the easement for public park/open-space purposes benefiting Lakewood |
Key Cases Cited
- Hornsilver Circle, Ltd. v. Trope, 904 P.2d 1353 (Colo. App. 1995) (an easement is valid if the servient tenement is accurately identified even if dominant-estate description is imperfect)
- Isenberg v. Woitchek, 356 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1960) (lack of specific description does not necessarily invalidate an easement; location may be established by conduct)
- Stevens v. Mannix, 77 P.3d 931 (Colo. App. 2003) (site-plan-type documents that reasonably designate the burdened land cure vagueness)
- Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229 (Colo. 1998) (ascertain intent from the deed; paramount concern is parties’ intent)
- Lewitz v. Porath Family Trust, 36 P.3d 120 (Colo. App. 2001) (discussion of notice and dominant-estate identification for appurtenant easements)
- Bolinger v. Neal, 259 P.3d 1259 (Colo. App. 2011) (trial court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine validity of an easement when description is ambiguous)
- Barnes v. Winford, 833 P.2d 756 (Colo. App. 1991) (reversion depends on actual use specified in deed, not zoning)