City of Krum v. Rice, 543 S.W.3d 747

In 2014 Rice pled guilty to sexual assault of a 14-year-old, received deferred adjudication with a condition barring him from going within 1,000 feet of places where children commonly gather, and was required to register as a sex offender.
The City of Krum had a sex-offender residency restriction ordinance (SORRO) barring certain registrants from residing within 2,000 feet of places where children gather; Rice lived with his parents 77 feet from a municipal park.
After his release Rice lived at his parents’ home and alleges Krum police ordered him to vacate under threat of enforcing the SORRO; he sued in 2015 challenging the SORRO as beyond a general-law city's authority.
The trial court denied Krum’s plea to the jurisdiction; a divided court of appeals affirmed, finding Rice had standing because Krum’s 2,000-foot SORRO was broader than his 1,000-foot supervision condition.
While this Court's review was pending, the Legislature enacted Local Government Code § 341.906 authorizing general-law cities to restrict registrants near “child safety zones” and capping restrictions at 1,000 feet; Krum amended its SORRO to mirror § 341.906.
The Court held Rice’s challenge was moot because the statutory change and Krum’s amended ordinance eliminated the gap between Rice’s supervision restriction and the SORRO, so any decision would not affect Rice’s rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge SORRO	Rice claimed injury because SORRO's 2,000-ft rule prevented him from residing in parts of Krum he wished to live in (e.g., parents' home)	Krum argued Rice lacked standing because his community supervision independently barred him within 1,000 ft, so SORRO added nothing traceable to the city	Previously, court of appeals found standing; on review this Court did not decide standing because case became moot
Jurisdiction to hear civil challenge to an ordinance (whether SORRO is penal)	Rice treated SORRO as a civil/regulatory ordinance subject to civil challenge	Krum argued SORRO was penal and not subject to civil jurisdiction	Court of appeals viewed SORRO as civil/regulatory; this Court did not resolve because of mootness
Mootness of challenge after enactment of § 341.906 and amended SORRO	Rice contended his challenge remained live because of prior enforcement and original SORRO language	Krum argued legislative change and amended ordinance made restrictions coextensive with supervision, rendering the dispute nonjusticiable	Supreme Court: challenge is moot; restriction gap eliminated, so court action would not affect Rice's rights
Remedy when claim becomes moot on appeal	N/A	N/A	Court vacated trial court and court of appeals judgments and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

Williams v. Huff, 52 S.W.3d 171 (recognizing mootness when no live controversy exists)
Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (discussing jurisdictional dismissal and effect of intervening legal changes on mootness)
Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 (directing that prior judgments be set aside when a case is dismissed as moot)
Freeman v. Burrows, 171 S.W.2d 863 (same principle concerning vacatur on dismissal for lack of jurisdiction)
Texas Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637 (contrast between powers of general-law and home-rule municipalities)
Town of Lakewood Village v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527 (same discussion of municipal powers)