City of Krum, Texas v. Taylor Rice
17-0081
| Tex. App. | Dec 22, 2017Background
- The State of Texas filed an amicus letter brief in City of Krum v. Rice concerning the effect of 2017 House Bill 1761 on this Court’s jurisdictional statutes (Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 22.001, 22.225).
- House Bill 1761 amended § 22.001 and repealed portions of § 22.225, effective September 1, 2017, requiring most interlocutory appeals to present a question of law important to the state’s jurisprudence for this Court to retain jurisdiction.
- Section 5 of the Act preserves the prior § 22.225(d) limited exception for certain interlocutory orders signed before the effective date, creating uncertainty about which interlocutory appeals pending on September 1, 2017, remain governed by the old law.
- Former § 22.225(d) had allowed petitions for review from interlocutory orders described in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(3), (6), (11), or (d) even when other bases for this Court’s jurisdiction (dissent or conflicts) could not be shown.
- The State argues that the Act’s transitional language means: (a) orders described by § 51.014(a)(3),(6),(11), or (d) that were signed before Sept. 1, 2017, remain governed by the pre-Act § 22.225(d); and (b) all other interlocutory appeals filed or decided after Sept. 1, 2017, are subject to the new § 22.001(a) importance requirement.
- The State asks the Court to reconsider footnote two of its per curiam opinion in City of Krum, which applied the 1985 Government Code despite the appeal arising under § 51.014(a)(8) and being decided after Sept. 1, 2017.
Issues
| Issue | City of Krum (Petitioner) argument | Rice (Respondent) argument | Held / Amicus position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HB 1761’s change to § 22.001 applies to appeals pending/decided after Sept. 1, 2017 | Court should apply pre-Act jurisdictional rules to appeals pending before effective date | New statute should govern jurisdiction when case is decided after Sept. 1, 2017 | State: New § 22.001 generally governs appeals decided after effective date unless § 5 preserves prior § 22.225(d) for specified pre‑Act orders |
| Scope of § 5’s transitional preservation of former § 22.225(d) | § 5 preserves prior § 22.225(d) broadly for interlocutory orders signed before effective date | § 5 ambiguous; could preserve fewer orders or extend to orders signed on/after effective date | State: § 5 preserves former § 22.225(d) only for interlocutory orders described by § 51.014(a)(3),(6),(11),or(d) that were signed before Sept. 1, 2017 |
| Whether appeals under § 51.014(a)(8) decided after Sept. 1, 2017 remain under old law | Appeals under § 51.014(a)(8) should be governed by new § 22.001 importance test if decided after effective date | Old law should apply to appeals pending before Sept. 1, 2017 | State: Appeals under (a)(8) decided after effective date are governed by HB 1761 unless they fit the narrow § 5 preservation |
| Correct interpretation of Court’s per curiam footnote applying 1985 Code in City of Krum | Court’s footnote was correct to apply earlier Code | Footnote’s application is incorrect as to appeals arising under § 51.014(a)(8) decided after effective date | State: Requests reconsideration of footnote two; contends footnote is inconsistent with HB 1761 and transitional rules |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2012) (new jurisdictional statutes applied as they exist when judgment is rendered)
- Texas Mun. Power Agency v. PUC, 253 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2007) (same rule on applying jurisdictional statutes at time of judgment)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2010) (applying later-enacted jurisdictional rules to pending cases)
- Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (discussing Landgraf and retroactivity concerns for jurisdictional changes)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (new statute conferring or ousting jurisdiction typically does not affect substantive rights)
- City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P., 409 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2013) (statutory construction principle: same words used throughout statute should have consistent meaning)