330 Conn. 200
Conn.2018Background
- Hartford used eminent domain in 2014 to take three adjacent parking-lot parcels (Parcels A, B, C; total 2.89 acres) owned by related CBV entities to advance a north-downtown redevelopment that included a proposed minor‑league ballpark.
- Prior to the taking, the city had bought two lots flanking Parcel A (LAZ lot and the "Ugly" lot) and solicited RFPs for a public/private redevelopment including the ballpark; DoNo submitted a proposal envisioning assemblage and mixed‑use development.
- CBV purchased the parcels in 2012, subdivided them, eliminated easements that impeded assemblage, and its principal (Yeatman) viewed assemblage with adjoining lots as the highest and best use and had financing/experience to develop.
- At condemnation the city offered ~$1.98M; the defendants’ appraisals (Michaud and Mulready) valued the property much higher ($4.81M and $5.22M). The trial court adopted the Michaud valuation of $4.81M, finding assemblage for redevelopment reasonably probable and that the city’s appraisals ignored the ballpark effect.
- Two weeks after the valuation judgment, the trial court awarded interest at 7.22%; the city appealed both the valuation (assembly assumption) and the interest award. The Supreme Court affirmed the valuation but reversed the 7.22% interest award and remanded for application of the statutory default rate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City) | Defendant's Argument (CBV) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court improperly valued property based on an unreasonable assumption that assemblage with city‑owned adjacent lots for commercial redevelopment was reasonably probable | Trial court failed to require proof assemblage would occur "in the absence of condemnation"; evidence insufficient and speculative | Assemblage was reasonably probable: city had bought adjacent lots, DoNo proposal and market studies supported redevelopment, and CBV had plans, removed impediments, and capacity to develop | Affirmed. Court held trial court applied correct legal standard and record (DoNo proposal, CBV conduct, city purchases, expert testimony) supported reasonable probability of assemblage affecting value |
| Whether trial court could set an interest rate (7.22%) after entering judgment rather than leave default statutory rate under § 37‑3c | Trial court lacked authority to fix a postjudgment rate other than the statute’s default when judgment of compensation did not set a rate; therefore default applies and postjudgment award of 7.22% was improper | Defendants treated interest as postjudgment element of damages and argued trial court could set a reasonable rate afterward; awarding higher rate was equitable and necessary to make them whole | Reversed as to interest. Court held § 37‑3c unambiguously requires the judgment of compensation to include the rate; if the judgment omits a rate, the statutory default computation applies. Trial court improperly awarded 7.22% and related offer‑of‑compromise interest |
Key Cases Cited
- Commissioner of Transportation v. Towpath Associates, 255 Conn. 529 (Conn. 2001) (assemblage doctrine; use must be reasonably probable and consider whether it would occur absent condemnation)
- Branford v. Santa Barbara, 294 Conn. 785 (Conn. 2010) (trial court may consider expert testimony in context of all evidence when assessing probability of future use)
- E. & F. Construction Co. v. Ives, 156 Conn. 416 (Conn. 1968) (interest to date of payment is an element of just compensation in condemnation)
- Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1973) (government may not force condemnees to bear increases in value created by the project for which property is taken)