City of Grand Junction & Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Nicola, 2026 CO 55

Danielle Nicola was struck by a car while crossing a street after dark, lost consciousness immediately, and died nineteen days later without a guardian or conservator ever being appointed. 1
Nearly two years after Danielle's death, her father John Nicola sued the City of Grand Junction and Xcel Energy asserting survival claims for negligence and premises liability based on allegedly faulty streetlights and signage. 2
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing section 13-81-103(1)(b) required the claims to be filed within one year of Danielle's death. 3
The district court agreed and dismissed the survival claims as untimely. 4
A court of appeals division reversed, holding subsection (1)(b) applies only if the decedent had a legal representative and died after the limitations period expired but within two years of appointment. 5
The supreme court granted certiorari, reversed, and held subsection (1)(b) applies whether or not a legal representative was appointed. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does section 13-81-103(1)(b) require a legal representative? 7	Nicola argued subsection (1)(b) applies only if Danielle had a legal representative.	Defendants argued subsection (1)(b) applies regardless of legal representation.	No; subsection (1)(b) applies without a legal representative. 8
What does 'the period of limitation in [subsection (1)(a)]' mean in subsection (1)(b)? 9	Nicola said it incorporates subsection (1)(a)'s legal-representative requirement.	Defendants said it means the ordinary limitations period, or extended time if a representative exists.	It means the ordinary limitations period, or extended time if a representative exists. 10
Were Nicola's survival claims timely? 11	Nicola claimed he could sue within the general survival-action limitations period.	Defendants said he had only one year after Danielle's death.	No; the claims were untimely under subsection (1)(b). 12
Are Defendants entitled to attorney fees? 13	Nicola opposed fee-shifting.	Defendants sought mandatory fees as prevailing defendants.	Yes; fees under section 13-17-201 are mandatory. 14

City of Grand Junction v. Nicola, 544 P.3d 120 (Colo. 2023) (court of appeals decision reversed for misreading subsection (1)(b) 15)
Colorado Department of Revenue v. Creager Mercantile Co., 395 P.3d 741 (Colo. 2017) (statutory-construction review is de novo 16)
Jordan v. Panorama Orthopedics & Spine Center, PC, 346 P.3d 1035 (Colo. 2015) (courts seek legislative intent from plain statutory language 17)
Jefferson County v. Dozier, 570 P.3d 482 (Colo. 2025) (courts do not add or subtract words from a statute 18)
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 375 P.3d 1214 (Colo. 2016) (absence of statutory language can reflect deliberate omission 19)
Brown v. Walker Commercial, Inc., 521 P.3d 1014 (Colo. 2022) (statutory scheme should be read harmoniously and sensibly 20)
City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1988) (the definite article particularizes the noun it modifies 21)
Colorado Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153 (Colo. 1988) (identical statutory phrases should generally carry the same meaning 22)
Kinslow v. Mohammadi, 546 P.3d 130 (Colo. 2024) (subsection (1)(c) can apply even though the limitations period is running, not tolled 23)
Rudnicki v. Bianco, 501 P.3d 776 (Colo. 2021) (prior disability-limitations cases involved minors and no specific subsection condition 24)
Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999) (older disability-limitations precedent overruled by Rudnicki 25)