876 N.W.2d 701
N.D.2016Background
- Jason Gale was cited for DUI on April 20, 1995; he retained counsel who filed a limited power of attorney and requested a jury trial.
- Gale failed to appear at a June 21, 1995 sentencing hearing after receiving three mailed notices; a warrant issued and the case then sat inactive.
- No prosecution activity is shown in the record for about 20 years until Gale moved to recall the warrant in March 2015; the City filed an amended information and tried the case in July 2015.
- At trial the arresting officer — relying largely on a 1995 report — was the sole witness; no blood-alcohol test evidence was admitted; a jury convicted Gale and the court sentenced under 1995 law.
- Gale moved to dismiss for violation of his constitutional speedy-trial rights; the district court denied the motion, finding Gale likely knew of the case; the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gale's Sixth Amendment / ND Constitution right to a speedy trial was violated by ~20 years of inaction after a warrant issued | City: Gale caused the delay by failing to appear and moving out of state; he knew of the case and never asserted the right | Gale: He thought his lawyer had closed the case and was unaware of the outstanding warrant; the City took no action to prosecute for 20 years | Reversed: Court held the 20-year delay was presumptively prejudicial, the City was negligent in prosecuting after the warrant issued, and Gale is entitled to a presumption of prejudice — speedy-trial violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (established the four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (delay can presumptively compromise trial reliability and prejudice may be presumed for extreme delays)
- Loud Hawk v. United States, 474 U.S. 302 (delay must be presumptively prejudicial to trigger full Barker analysis)
- Moran v. State, 711 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 2006) (state speedy-trial analysis and burden allocation for diligence/neglect)
- Runck v. State, 418 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1988) (Rule 48(b) factors parallel constitutional speedy-trial considerations)
- Littlewind v. State, 417 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1987) (characterizing delay lengths in speedy-trial context)
- Cardona v. United States, 302 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2002) (diligent prosecution vs. negligence distinctions control prejudice burdens)
- Gabbert v. City of Kalispell, 338 P.3d 51 (Mont. 2014) (distinguishing cases where courts and law enforcement actively pursued a defendant after failure to appear)
- Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (recognized speedy trial as a fundamental constitutional right)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (noting the right’s relative and flexible character in allocation of delay responsibility)