476 S.W.3d 282
Mo.2016Background
- In 2013 the legislature added §321.322.4, which exempts cities meeting six specific criteria (operate city fire dept.; third-class city; population >6,000 and <7,000; located in a charter county with population >200,000 and <350,000; entirely surrounded by a single fire protection district) from the general post-annexation payment rules in §321.322.1.
- De Soto (a third-class city of ~6,421 in Jefferson County) and resident James Acres sued for a declaratory judgment that §321.322.4 is an unconstitutional special law under Mo. Const. art. III, §40; De Soto meets all six statutory criteria.
- The parties relied on 2010 census data and official fire district maps; both sides agreed the facts relevant to the motions for summary judgment were undisputed.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding the statute’s criteria were open-ended because political changes could bring other jurisdictions within the classification.
- The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed de novo, applied the Jefferson County three-part test for when population-based classifications are effectively closed-ended, and considered the six statutory criteria as a whole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §321.322.4 is a "special law" in violation of art. III, §40 | The six combined criteria are so narrowly drawn that only De Soto fits them in practice, so the statute is a closed-ended special law | The criteria are open-ended (population and political statuses can change), so the statute is a permissible general classification | Held: §321.322.4 is a special law — the combined criteria, as a practical matter, apply only to De Soto |
| Whether courts should evaluate each statutory criterion separately or consider them collectively | The six criteria must be considered together because the exemption requires all to be met | The State argued separate criteria are open-ended so statute is not closed-ended | Held: The six criteria must be considered as a whole when determining whether the classification is effectively closed-ended |
| Whether the State carried the burden to justify a facially special law | De Soto: once the law is shown special, the State must show substantial justification and it produced none | State: urged permissive construction and potential for other jurisdictions to qualify over time | Held: Burden shifted to State and it offered no substantial justification; judgment reversed for De Soto |
| Appropriate remedy (remand vs. entry of judgment for De Soto) | De Soto sought entry of summary judgment in its favor | State sought remand so it could try to justify the law or show others now qualify | Held: No remand — Court entered judgment for De Soto because both motions were based on the same undisputed facts and the State presented no justification |
Key Cases Cited
- Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist’s Ass’n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866 (Mo. banc 2006) (adopted three-part test for when population-based classifications are effectively closed-ended and thus special laws)
- City of St. Louis v. State, 382 S.W.3d 905 (Mo. banc 2012) (discussed open- vs. closed-ended classifications and related constitutional analysis)
- ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (standard of review for summary judgment; de novo review)
- Tillis v. City of Branson, 945 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. banc 1997) (laws based on closed-ended characteristics are facially special requiring justification)
- O’Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. banc 1993) (population classifications ordinarily open-ended and presumptively constitutional)
- McKaig v. Kansas City, 256 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. banc 1953) (court must look to a statute’s practical operation to determine if it in fact applies only to particular entities)
- Bob DeGeorge Assocs., Inc. v. Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. banc 2012) (intertwined summary-judgment motions may be reviewed together on appeal)