City of Dayton v. Smith, 106 N.E.3d 901

On May 10, 2016, a toy poodle (Snoop) owned by the Beals was found dead after an incident at the shared boundary between 430 and 424 Red Haw Road; Smith owned two dogs (Buddy and Remy) at 424.
Gregory Beal (eyewitness) testified Buddy crossed through a broken fence, grabbed Snoop on the Beals’ driveway, and carried him into Smith’s yard; officers found Snoop with puncture wounds.
Police and an Animal Resource Center officer photographed the scene and observed the Smiths’ dogs leashed to leads that extended through the broken fence onto the Beals’ property.
Smith and her husband admitted one of their dogs caused Snoop’s death but testified an igloo doghouse was resting on the main chain, preventing the leads from reaching the Beals’ property; Smith claimed she moved the igloo before officers measured the leads.
Smith was convicted after a bench trial of violating Dayton R.C.G.O. 91.50(A)(5) (permitting a dog to bite or otherwise cause physical harm to another domestic animal); court imposed probation, restitution, dangerous-dog designation, and transfer/ban conditions.
On appeal Smith argued (1) the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because she established the affirmative defense in R.C.G.O. 91.50(D)(2), and (2) the ordinance phrase “such dog” is unconstitutionally vague.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence	State: eyewitness, officers, and photos show Smith’s dogs could reach Beals’ property and Buddy grabbed Snoop, supporting guilt	Smith: igloo doghouse and chain placement prevented leads from extending; thus Snoop was unlawfully on Smith’s property and dogs were secured (affirmative defense under § 91.50(D)(2))	Court affirmed: credibility given to officers/eyewitness and photos; affirmative defense not proven; conviction not against manifest weight
Whether § 91.50(D)(2) is unconstitutionally vague for using phrase “such dog”	State: ordinance read with § 91.50(A)(5) gives sufficient notice and guidance	Smith: “such dog” is ambiguous as to which dog is referenced, rendering the defense vague	Court affirmed: phrase refers to the dog that bit or caused harm; not unconstitutionally vague; claim forfeited but no plain-error shown

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (standard for manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review)
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967) (credibility and weight of witness testimony are factual matters for the trier of fact)
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1983) (reversal for manifest weight only in exceptional cases)
State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120 (1986) (constitutional objections must generally be raised at first opportunity)
State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464 (2014) (plain-error standard for addressing forfeited constitutional claims)
Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376 (1997) (vagueness analysis requires notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement)
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (due-process vagueness principles)