City of Dallas v. Stewart
361 S.W.3d 562
| Tex. | 2012Background
- Heather Stewart’s Dallas property was declared an urban nuisance by the City’s URSB, leading to demolition after hearings and a rehearing.
- Stewart appealed the nuisance determination in district court; demolition occurred before the appeal stayed the order.
- The trial court, on substantial-evidence review, affirmed the nuisance finding for damages, and reserved constitutional claims for a takings suit.
- Stewart later asserted takings and due-process claims challenging the nuisance finding and demolition.
- The court of appeals held the nuisance finding could not be given preclusive effect in Stewart’s takings claim, and the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether independent court review is required for constitutional rights when a nuisance determination precedes demolition.
- The Court ultimately held that substantial-evidence review cannot preclude a takings claim and that de novo judicial review is constitutionally necessary for such constitutional questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether URSB nuisance finding has preclusive effect in a takings suit | Stewart argues the nuisance finding should be fully reviewable de novo | City asserts res judicata/preclusive effect via substantial-evidence review | URSB finding not preclusive; de novo review required |
| Whether takings claims arising from nuisance demolitions must be decided de novo in court | Stewart seeks independent court determination of the nuisance issue | Agency findings can be reviewed for substantial evidence | Takings claim must be decided in court on de novo review of constitutional questions |
| Whether legislative nuisance statutes provide due process and limit review | Statutory scheme lacks due-process protections for takings | Statutes define nuisance and provide for notice, hearings, and substantial-evidence review | Legislative scheme valid; due process satisfied under the statutory framework |
| Role of constitutional fact doctrine in nuisance takings | Constitutional rights require independent factual review | Constitutional review should not automatically override statutory review framework | Court retains independent constitutional review for the takings issue; not bound by agency’s factual determinations |
Key Cases Cited
- Lurie v. City of Houston, 224 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1949) (nuisance determinations must be judicially reviewed; not final agency determination)
- Reagan v. City of Texarkana, 247 S.W. 816 (Tex. 1923) (nuisance determinations require judicial determination in fact)
- Crossman v. City of Galveston, 247 S.W. 810 (Tex. 1923) (nuisance determinations are justiciable questions for courts)
- Stockwell v. State, 221 S.W. 932 (Tex. 1920) (nuisance determinations require judicial application of general terms to facts)
- Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) (Takings clause self-executing; agency action not always final in takings)
- Blackbird v. City of Houston, 394 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1965) (due process in assessments; distinction between takings and due-process challenges)
- Brazosport Saving & Loan Ass’n v. American Saving & Loan Ass’n, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1961) (due-process review when agency acts affecting property rights; substantial-evidence standard often appropriate)
- Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) (takings questions involve mixed questions of law and fact; de novo review may be required)
- Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (U.S. 1932) (constitutional-facts must be found by courts; recognition of constitutional fact doctrine)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (U.S. 1984) (independent, de novo review of constitutional determinations in some contexts)
