City of Dallas v. Diane Sanchez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Matthew Sanchez, and Arnold Sanchez
494 S.W.3d 722
| Tex. | 2016Background
- In Nov. 2012 two 9-1-1 calls about separate drug overdoses were received at the same Dallas apartment complex within about ten minutes.
- The second call, placed for Matthew Sanchez at 2:55 a.m., included his apartment number but disconnected before being reestablished.
- Responders went to the complex to assist the first caller, concluded the two calls were redundant, never went to Sanchez’s unit, and left; Sanchez died ~6 hours later.
- Sanchez’s parents sued Dallas for wrongful death, alleging either dispatcher misconduct (hanging up) or a 9-1-1 system malfunction that caused the premature disconnection and prevented aid.
- The City moved to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) immunity waiver does not apply because the alleged harms arise from communication/dispatch decisions and the overdose — not a condition or use of tangible property; alternatively, the 9-1-1 statutory exception applied.
- The trial court dismissed most claims but allowed the phone-system-defect claim to proceed; the court of appeals reversed as to that claim. The Texas Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TTCA waives immunity under §101.021(2) for alleged 9‑1‑1 phone system defect that disconnected Sanchez’s call | The phone system malfunction (or dispatcher hanging up) was a condition/use of tangible personal property that proximately caused Sanchez’s death by preventing timely aid | The allegations involve communication/dispatch decisions and an underlying drug overdose, not a condition/use of tangible property; even if a system defect occurred, it did not proximately cause death | No waiver: the alleged phone defect was too attenuated and did not actually cause Sanchez’s death; dismissal under Rule 91a required |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a statutory-violation exception to the 9‑1‑1 immunity exclusion (§101.062) | Plaintiffs alleged violations of federal, state, or local statutes/regulations by dispatcher or system, fitting the §101.062 exception | The pleadings did not sufficiently establish that a statutory violation was the proximate cause or that the exception applied | Court rejected waiver on proximate-cause grounds; did not find sufficient nexus to invoke the statutory exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Dallas County v. Posey, 290 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2009) (property must actually have caused injury to waive immunity)
- Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001) (delay or interference that merely hinders treatment is not proximate cause)
- Bossley v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) (use or condition of property must be a substantial factor, not merely make injury possible)
- Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015) (proximate-cause analysis requires cause in fact and foreseeability)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (pleadings liberally construed for jurisdictional questions)
