City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368

Dallas adopted a voter-approved pay ordinance in 1979 providing 15% raises and maintaining the pay differential for sworn officers, firefighters, and rescue workers.
In 1994, Officers sued for declaratory relief interpreting the ordinance and for breach of contract damages for underpayment.
City counterclaimed for recovery of alleged overpayments; later sought immunity and, subsequently, dismissed the counterclaim.
During the litigation, the Legislature enacted retroactive waiver of immunity for certain contract claims via Local Government Code § 271.151-.160 and § 271.152, creating a potential waiver question.
The court of appeals remanded for the trial court to consider whether the new statutory waiver applied; the Supreme Court granted review.
Central issues: effect of the counterclaim and its nonsuit on immunity, potential statutory waiver of immunity, immunity from declaratory judgment, and immunity despite referendum.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Effect of nonsuit on immunity	Officers argue nonsuit reinstates City immunity fully.	City argues nonsuit does not reinstate complete immunity due to offsetting claims.	Nonsuit does not reinstate full immunity; offsetting claims remain governed by prior abrogations.
Legislative waiver under § 271.152	Waiver may apply retroactively to allow breach claims.	Waiver may not be decided on remand; the issue is jurisdictional until addressed.	Remanded for trial court to determine whether § 271.152 retroactively waives immunity for the Officers’ breach claims.
Declaratory Judgment Act and immunity	DJA may waive immunity for declaration of ordinance interpretation and future pay.	DJA cannot circumvent immunity for retrospective damages claims.	Officers’ DJA claims seeking retrospective damages are barred; DJA cannot be used to obtain future relief; immunity remains for past due payments.
Referendum-and-immunity	Referendum demonstrates consent and thus waives immunity.	Referendum did not waive immunity; it is a legislative act but not consent to suit.	Referendum adoption does not waive or abrogate the City’s immunity.

Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006) (offsetting, germane to and properly defensive against claims can abrogate immunity)
Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (sue and be sued language does not unambiguously waive immunity)
City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2011) (explicit DJA-based immunity waivers for ordinance validity; money damages context)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (DJA is a procedural device; cannot enlarge jurisdiction; ultra vires claims retrospective relief only)
Blum v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1999) (initiative/referendum participants have justiciable interest; city consent not implied)
Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2003) (immunity considerations and waiver by conduct nuanced in public contracts)
Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) (legislative waiver generally necessary for immunity from suit)
City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2007) (clarifies DJA does not enlarge jurisdiction; money damages bar declaratory relief)