City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
863 F.3d 474
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- After the 2008 crisis, Cincinnati alleged Wells Fargo adopted a cost-benefit "policy" of not repairing certain foreclosed properties, causing code violations and public-safety harms.
- The City sued Wells Fargo (and Deutsche Bank) asserting municipal-code violations, statutory public nuisance, common-law public nuisance (qualified and absolute), and other claims; most claims and Deutsche Bank claims were later settled or dismissed.
- Remaining at issue on appeal: Claim 6 — damages for common-law public nuisance against Wells Fargo (the City abandoned injunctive/declaratory relief).
- The district court dismissed Claim 6, holding (1) the economic-loss doctrine bars recovery for the City’s qualified public-nuisance damages and (2) the City failed to plead proximate cause for its asserted economic harms (tax revenue loss, increased police/fire and administrative costs).
- The City appealed; the Sixth Circuit majority affirmed dismissal, while the Chief Judge concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing the complaint plausibly alleged an absolute public nuisance against Wells Fargo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether economic-loss doctrine bars damages for a qualified public nuisance | City: tort recovery is available for public-nuisance damages arising from banks' misconduct | Wells Fargo: economic-loss doctrine bars recovery of purely economic harms absent physical injury | Held: Yes — economic-loss doctrine bars the City’s qualified public-nuisance damages claim |
| Whether the complaint pleads an absolute (intentional or abnormally dangerous) public nuisance | City: allegations that Wells Fargo intentionally left properties dilapidated and dangerous suffice to plead absolute nuisance | Wells Fargo: City removed absolute-nuisance allegations and allegations show only knowledge, not intent; pleading lacks necessary elements | Held: Majority — no viable absolute nuisance claim in the operative complaint; City failed to plead intent or inherently dangerous condition |
| Whether the complaint sufficiently identifies nuisance properties and links them to City’s alleged damages (proximate cause) | City: extensive exhibits and thousands of code-enforcement pages plausibly tie Wells Fargo policy to municipal harms; specificity can be resolved in discovery | Wells Fargo: City dismissed claims tied to the named properties; complaint now seeks damages for unidentified or future properties, so causation and plausibility fail | Held: Majority — City failed to identify current Wells Fargo nuisance properties and thus failed plausibly to plead proximate cause for its economic damages |
| Whether the City may use nuisance law to challenge a company-wide policy of selective noncompliance (facial attack) | City: overarching policy produced systemic harms and is the proper subject of nuisance law | Wells Fargo: a cost-benefit policy is not a nuisance in all its applications; nuisance law addresses actual conditions, not abstract policies | Held: Majority — policy alone is insufficient; nuisance claim requires an actual unsafe/unsanitary condition tied to identifiable properties |
Key Cases Cited
- Queen City Terminals v. Gen. Am. Trans., 73 Ohio St.3d 609, 653 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1995) (economic-loss doctrine bars recovery for purely economic damages absent physical injury)
- City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (nuisance law and proximate-cause analysis adopting Holmes factors)
- Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (directness/proximate-cause factors for complex chain-of-causation claims)
- City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of city’s nuisance claim for lack of proximate cause where intervening actors and better-positioned plaintiffs existed)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: complaint must state a plausible claim, not merely conclusory assertions)
