City of Casper, and V.H. Mcdonald, CPA, In His Capacity as the Administrative Services Director of the City of Casper v. Kimberly Holloway, Individually and as a Citizen of Casper, Wyoming, and as a Member of the Smoke Free Committee, 2015 WY 93

Casper City adopted 2012 smoking ordinance; 2013 amendment loosened restrictions, notably bars allowed to permit smoking.
Smoke Free Committee sought referendum under §22-23-1005; City Clerk collaborated on petition form requiring signatures to match the voter registration list.
Committee submitted 59 petitions with 3,078 signatures; Clerk and staff reviewed against Natrona County voter list and found 2,393 valid signatures.
Petition drive required 2,454 valid signatures (10% of Casper’s 24,543 registered voters); referendum fell short by 61 signatures; Clerk certified results to the City Manager.
Holloway challenged Clerk’s determinations in district court, seeking declaratory/injunctive relief; district court ruled largely for Holloway, including that Clerk acted arbitrarily by disqualifying signatures, but concluded jurisdiction under §22-24-122.
Subsequently, Clerk reviewed an additional 102 signatures submitted by the Committee; counts were updated in part; proceedings proceeded to appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court had jurisdiction to review the City Clerk’s determination.	Holloway argued declaratory relief under W.R.A.P. 12.12 and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (1-37-101 et seq.).	City contended §22-24-122 limits review to statewide initiatives/referenda; no jurisdiction for municipal referenda.	Jurisdiction lies under 12.12/1-37-101, not §22-24-122; district court erred in relying on §22-24-122.
How §22-23-1005 defines a ‘qualified elector’ for a municipal referendum when a signer’s city address differs from the voter registration list.	A signer who moved within Casper but did not update the county list remains a qualified elector.	The clerk’s requirement of exact or current address matching the voter list is the controlling standard.	A signer who moved within the city can remain a qualified elector; address mismatch alone does not automatically disqualify.
Whether the City Clerk could automatically reject signatures where petition addresses did not match the registration list.	Clerk must review totality of information; cannot automatically discount solely due to address mismatch.	Clerk may disqualify based on statutory criteria for signatures.	Clerk must consider totality of information; automatic rejection on address mismatch is not required or permissible.

Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982) (statutory controls promote accurate initiative/referendum review; importance of preventing fraud)
Voss v. Goodman, 203 P.3d 415 (Wyo. 2009) (declaratory judgments apply to agency action; liberally construed)
Wyoming Cmty. Coll. Comm’n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 31 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2001) (declaratory judgment availability in agency/regulatory context)
Hirschfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139 (Wyo. 1997) (liberal construction of declaratory judgments; statutory interpretation)
North Laramie Range Found. v. Converse Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 290 P.3d 1063 (Wyo. 2012) (standard of review and statutory construction considerations)