City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals v. UJ-Eighty Corporation, 141 N.E.3d 869

In 2015 Bloomington amended its Unified Development Ordinance to define “Fraternity/Sorority House” to require: (1) all residents be enrolled at Indiana University–Bloomington and (2) IU have sanctioned/recognized the students “through whatever procedures Indiana University uses.”
UJ‑Eighty leased an Institutional‑zoned house to the Gamma‑Kappa chapter of Tau Kappa Epsilon (TKE) in 2016; IU later withdrew recognition of the local TKE chapter in Feb. 2018.
After most members moved out, the City issued two Notices of Violation to UJ‑Eighty, concluding the Property no longer qualified as a permitted fraternity/sorority house and therefore was an unlawful dwelling use in the Institutional zone.
The Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirmed the NOVs; UJ‑Eighty sought judicial review and argued the Ordinance unlawfully delegated zoning authority to IU in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution.
The trial court agreed, held the Ordinance an unconstitutional delegation of authority (due process), set aside the BZA decision, and ordered the NOVs vacated; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on federal due‑process grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (UJ‑Eighty)	Defendant's Argument (BZA/City)	Held
Whether the Ordinance unconstitutionally delegated zoning power to Indiana University in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment	The definition vests IU with uncontrolled authority to determine zoning status (via its sanctioning decisions) without standards or review, exposing owners to arbitrary deprivation of property use	The definition merely identifies fraternities as university‑affiliated entities; it is reasonable to rely on IU recognition/sanction decisions and the City still enforces the ordinance	Held: Ordinance impermissibly delegated authority to IU. No standards or review were provided; delegation violated substantive/procedural due process principles. Definition struck down and NOVs vacated.
Whether the Ordinance is facially invalid given constitutional presumptions and available procedural safeguards	The Ordinance lacks safeguards (standards, review) and thus is subject to arbitrary third‑party action that deprives property owners of use without due process	Presumption of constitutionality applies; Eldridge balancing shows additional procedures are not required; IU is a state actor bound by constitution and its internal processes mitigate risk	Held: Majority rejected these defenses; applied Roberge and related authorities to find unlawful delegation and affirmed relief. (Dissent would have upheld the ordinance.)

Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (ordinance delegating permit power to third parties without standards or review is repugnant to Fourteenth Amendment)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three‑factor test to determine required procedural protections)
Counceller v. City of Columbus Plan Comm’n, 42 N.E.3d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (zoning provisions that abdicate planning authority without restriction can be unconstitutional; distinguishing permissible waiver/review mechanisms)
Ragucci v. Metropolitan Dev. Comm’n of Marion Cty., 702 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. 1998) (zoning ordinances are legislative in nature and presumed constitutional; review standards explained)
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (substantive due process requires laws affecting fundamental rights to be reasonably related to permissible state objectives)