City of Billings Ex Rel. Huertas v. Billings Municipal Court
2017 MT 261
| Mont. | 2017Background
- Defendant James Huertas was tried in Billings Municipal Court on a Partner or Family Member Assault charge; jury was impaneled and sworn and trial began on Jan. 20, 2017.
- During the City’s case, the prosecution’s witness L.H. testified she had been served a subpoena the night before by Officer LaMantia and said the officer attempted to influence her to ensure Huertas would be punished.
- The court questioned L.H. outside the jury’s presence; L.H.’s statements there were less accusatory and the judge concluded she was not improperly influenced, but repeatedly stated the jury might be "poisoned."
- The City moved for a mistrial to investigate alleged witness tampering by its own officer; the judge declared a mistrial and reset the trial date despite available remedial measures and the City being responsible for its witness’s subpoena.
- Huertas moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; Municipal Court denied the motion. The District Court declined relief, and the Montana Supreme Court accepted supervisory control.
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held no "manifest necessity" supported the mistrial and Huertas did not acquiesce, and therefore retrial would violate double jeopardy; the case was dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mistrial was justified by "manifest necessity" after jury heard witness say an officer tried to influence her | Huertas: No; mistrial was unnecessary because remedial measures (redirect, clarification before jury) were available and the City was not prejudiced sufficiently to warrant termination | City: Mistrial necessary to investigate alleged witness tampering by Officer LaMantia and because the jury was "poisoned" and the City was prejudiced | Held: No manifest necessity; judge abused discretion in declaring mistrial and available remedies could have addressed the statements |
| Whether retrial is allowed because defendant acquiesced (waived) right against retrial | Huertas: He did not acquiesce; neither he nor counsel affirmatively waived the right and counsel was repeatedly interrupted when attempting to object | City: Implied acquiescence or lack of objection permitted retrial | Held: No acquiescence; defendant did not affirmatively waive the right and was denied adequate opportunity to be heard |
| Whether double jeopardy bars retrial after mistrial declared by court sua sponte or at prosecution request | Huertas: Retrial would violate Fifth Amendment and Mont. Const. protections because no manifest necessity and no waiver | City: Retrial permitted given the circumstances and need to investigate potential witness tampering | Held: Retrial barred; dismissal with prejudice because retrial would violate federal and state double jeopardy protections |
| Whether the District Court erred in denying pre-trial relief and requiring appeal after a second trial | Huertas: Pre-trial relief is required because double jeopardy protections must be enforced before a second trial occurs | City: Appeal after trial is adequate remedy | Held: Supreme Court exercised supervisory control consistent with Keating — pre-trial relief was appropriate to prevent the constitutional harm of a second trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Keating v. Sherlock, 278 Mont. 218, 924 P.2d 1297 (1996) (supervisory control appropriate to prevent double jeopardy before second trial)
- State v. Carney, 219 Mont. 412, 714 P.2d 532 (1986) ("manifest necessity" standard and degree-based analysis for mistrials)
- State v. Cates, 350 Mont. 38, 204 P.3d 1224 (2009) (acquiescence/waiver analysis and review of mistrial declarations)
- United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (double jeopardy protects right to have trial completed by particular tribunal)
- Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (manifest necessity concept for terminating trials)
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (spectrum of scrutiny for mistrial justifications; strict scrutiny when prosecution-produced prejudice)
