City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC
596 U.S. 61
| SCOTUS | 2022Background
- Austin's sign code prohibited new off-premises signs (billboards) and grandfathered existing off-premises signs but barred alterations that increased nonconformity, including digitization; on-premises signs could be digitized.
- Reagan and Lamar (outdoor-advertising companies) own Austin billboards; Reagan applied to digitize some off-premises billboards and the City denied the permits.
- Reagan sued claiming the on-/off-premises distinction violated the First Amendment by discriminating based on message; the City removed to federal court and Lamar intervened.
- The District Court held the provisions were facially content neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny; the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the distinction content based under Reed because officials must read signs to classify them and therefore strict scrutiny applied.
- The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit: it held the on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral (not subject to Reed strict-scrutiny), but remanded for the lower courts to address (1) whether the City acted with an impermissible content-based purpose and (2) whether the regulation satisfies intermediate-scrutiny tailoring.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Austin’s on-/off‑premises distinction facially content‑based under Reed v. Town of Gilbert? | Reagan: The code is content based because officials must read a sign’s message to decide if it’s off‑premises. | Austin: The distinction regulates location, not subject matter; message only shows whether the sign refers off‑site. | Held: Not facially content based — the distinction is location‑based and content‑agnostic, so Reed strict scrutiny does not automatically apply. |
| Does the need to read a sign to apply the rule automatically render a regulation content based? | Reagan: Yes — any regulation that requires reading the sign is content based under Reed. | Austin: No — many content‑neutral rules (e.g., solicitation controls) require reading speech to determine applicability. | Held: No — requiring examination of speech to draw neutral, location‑based lines does not by itself make a regulation content based. |
| Does Reed’s ‘‘function or purpose’’ language mean any regulation that classifies by function/purpose is content based? | Reagan: Reed’s language covers function/purpose proxies; on‑/off‑premises is a function‑based proxy and thus content based. | Austin: Reed forbids disguised subject‑matter discrimination, but does not convert every function/purpose classification into content discrimination. | Held: Reagan’s reading is too broad; Reed prevents proxies that replicate subject‑matter discrimination, but does not sweep away longstanding neutral regulations that consider function/location. |
| If the distinction is content neutral, can the City justify it under intermediate scrutiny? | Reagan: The City cannot show the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve significant interests (safety, aesthetics). | Austin: The City asserts significant interests in traffic safety and aesthetics and that regulating off‑premises/digital billboards advances those interests. | Held: The Court did not decide this—remanded for the lower courts to evaluate whether (a) there is any impermissible content‑based purpose and (b) the ordinance is narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests under intermediate scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (defines content‑based regulation as one that targets speech because of its topic, idea, or message)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (intermediate scrutiny for content‑neutral time, place, and manner restrictions: narrow tailoring to serve significant government interest)
- Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (regulation of solicitation that requires reading speech can remain content neutral if applied evenhandedly)
- Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality) (upheld certain off‑premises commercial sign restrictions; commercial‑speech doctrine context)
- Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (described an off‑premises billboard prohibition as content neutral)
- Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (recognized State power to regulate time, place, manner of solicitation)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (noted a regulation is content based if enforcement requires examining the content of the message)
- Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (early approval of location‑based advertising distinctions)
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (warning that content‑based regulations carry special risks of censorship)