City of Austin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5306
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- wildfire started September 4, 2011 in a vacant lot in western Travis County and spread to Steiner Ranch, causing personal injury and extensive property damage.
- Insurers filed subrogation claims on behalf of insured property owners; Homeowners asserted uninsured fire losses, personal injury, and property damage claims.
- Plaintiffs alleged the City caused the fire by allowing overhead distribution lines to come into contact due to slack from forgoing regular inspections and a repair-as-needed maintenance approach.
- The fire spread across Highway 620 and embers ignited vegetation due to alleged electrical arcing from the lines.
- The City moved to dismiss under Rule 91a; the trial court denied the motion, and the City appealed under section 51.014(a)(8) as an interlocutory appeal to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The court addresses whether takings claims are barred by immunity, whether tort claims arise from governmental versus proprietary functions, and whether a charter notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are inverse-condemnation claims properly pleaded and jurisdictionally sound? | Insurers/Homeowners plead intent and public-use elements for takings. | City did not plead or prove intentional or substantially certain damage; no public-use taking. | No valid inverse-condemnation jurisdiction; claims dismissed for lack of takings jurisdiction. |
| Are the common-law tort claims barred by governmental immunity or preserved by proprietary-function status? | City’s actions in operating a public utility are proprietary and not immune. | Tort acts were governmental (fire protection/control/engineering) and immune absent waiver. | Tort claims arise from proprietary functions; immunity does not bar them. |
| Does the Austin City Charter notice requirement affect subject-matter jurisdiction? | Notice is jurisdictional under the charter and may bar claims absent compliance. | Charter notice is a bar to liability/immunity, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. | Charter notice is not a jurisdictional prerequisite; does not divest jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Texas Natural Res. Conserv. Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (sovereign immunity defines party liability)
- Holland v. State, 221 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. 2007) (takings immunity and constitutional waivers)
- Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992) (inverse condemnation and adequacy of compensation)
- Jennings v. City of Dallas, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004) (intent and public-use requirements for takings)
- Pollock v. Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P., 284 S.W.3d 821 (Tex.2010) (substantially certain standard for takings intent)
- Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (propriety of municipal immunity for torts)
- Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. City of L-Tex, 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001) (immunity and takings framework)
- Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty., 267 S.W.3d 490 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (takings and governmental action standards)