City of Austin v. Ken Paxton, 943 F.3d 993

Austin enacted an ordinance prohibiting landlords from refusing tenants who pay with federal housing-choice vouchers to promote fair housing access.
Texas responded by passing Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 250.007, prohibiting municipalities from enacting ordinances that bar landlords from refusing tenants based on use of federal housing assistance.
The City sued Texas officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging § 250.007 is preempted by federal law; the State moved to dismiss on standing and Eleventh Amendment grounds.
The district court denied dismissal, concluding the City had standing and that the suit could proceed against Attorney General Ken Paxton and the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) under Ex parte Young.
The State appealed only the sovereign-immunity ruling; the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding Paxton lacks a sufficient enforcement connection for Ex parte Young and TWC, as a state agency, is immune.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AG Paxton is subject to Ex parte Young for § 250.007	Paxton has authority to enforce § 250.007 and has a history of intervening to vindicate state law, so he has a sufficient connection	Paxton lacks the particular enforcement role or demonstrated willingness to enforce § 250.007; mere authority is insufficient	Reversed: Paxton lacks the requisite enforcement connection; suit against him is barred by Eleventh Amendment
Whether Texas Workforce Commission is subject to Ex parte Young	City named TWC as a defendant to obtain relief	State agencies are arms of the state and immune from suit; Ex parte Young applies only to individual officers	Reversed: TWC is a state agency and immune; City failed to name individual officers, so Young does not save the suit
Whether allegation of federal preemption satisfies the Verizon/Young threshold for prospective relief	Allegation that § 250.007 is preempted alleges ongoing federal-law violation and requests prospective relief	(State did not contest that pleading a preemption claim can satisfy Verizon)	Held: The complaint satisfies the Verizon standard as to alleging an ongoing violation, but that alone does not establish Young jurisdiction over Paxton or TWC

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (creates exception to Eleventh Amendment for prospective suits against state officers acting unlawfully)
Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (asks only whether complaint alleges ongoing violation and seeks prospective relief)
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (plurality) (articulated a ‘particular duty and demonstrated willingness’ standard for Young’s enforcement connection)
K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115 (5th Cir. 2010) (interprets enforcement as compulsion or constraint; questioned Okpalobi’s precedential force)
Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 851 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2017) (applied Young where officials’ actions constrained plaintiffs under the challenged scheme)
NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2015) (considered AG’s threatening enforcement communications and ongoing federal-law violation allegation)
Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014) (dismissed suit against governor where statute assigned enforcement to another agency)
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2002) (state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity)
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (threat of prosecution can make federal declaratory relief appropriate)
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (Article III standing requires injury that is concrete, imminent, and traceable)