City of Aurora v. Scott
2017 COA 24
Colo. Ct. App.2017Background
- City of Aurora adopted two multi-phase urban renewal plans (Fitzsimons and Iliff) that included immediate TIF for early phases and language delaying TIF for later phases.
- Arapahoe County Assessor immediately calculated base valuations for all phases and began allocating tax increment financing (TIF) based on the plans’ approval dates.
- Aurora and the Aurora Urban Renewal Authority sued the Assessor seeking an order to delay TIF allocations consistent with the plans’ delayed-phase language.
- The district court entered judgment for the Assessor, holding the Urban Renewal Law (URL) does not allow municipalities to postpone the start of a TIF period by writing a later effective date into an originally approved plan.
- Aurora appealed, arguing waiver/preclusion/estoppel barred the Assessor’s defense and that the URL permits municipalities to set a later effective date for parts of a plan; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Aurora) | Defendant's Argument (Assessor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether arbitration under §31-25-107(12) or failure to use arbitration/Rule 106 waived Assessor’s defense | Arbitration is the county’s exclusive remedy for challenges to a plan; failure to arbitrate waives defense | Subsection (12) is limited to specific notice/compliance claims; arbitration is not the exclusive remedy for this TIF timing dispute | Assessor not barred; arbitration applies only to specified compliance matters, not this statutory-interpretation claim |
| Whether claim/issue preclusion bars Assessor from litigating the statute’s meaning | Public hearings/adoption of plans preclude relitigation of TIF timing | No prior adjudication of the statutory issue; Assessor was not a party to approval hearings | Preclusion doctrines inapplicable; issue was not actually litigated and Assessor was not party/privity |
| Whether equitable estoppel prevents Assessor from asserting his interpretation | Aurora relied on the City approvals and Assessor’s silence | County/Assessor had no role or duty in plan approvals; Aurora could not reasonably rely on their silence | Estoppel does not apply; no justifiable detrimental reliance on Assessor/County inaction |
| Whether URL permits municipalities to delay the start of the 25‑year TIF period by drafting later "effective dates" into an original plan | URL language allows an "effective date of adoption of such a provision" distinct from plan approval date, so City may defer TIF start for phases | "Adoption"/"approval" are synonymous; TIF period runs from the date the plan or a later modification containing a TIF provision is approved; municipalities cannot manufacture later effective dates in the original approval to evade the 25‑year cap | Court affirmed: TIF must begin on the effective date the plan or a modification containing the TIF provision is approved; municipalities cannot extend the 25‑year limit by deeming parts of an originally approved plan effective at later dates |
Key Cases Cited
- Duran v. Housing Auth. of City & Cty. of Denver, 761 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1988) (waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right)
- City & County of Denver v. Block 173 Associates, 814 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1991) (collateral estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated)
- ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 192 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2008) (statutory interpretation principles; give words their plain meaning)
- Huddleston v. Grand County Board of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1996) (administrative guidance not binding on courts for questions of law)
- E. Grand County Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Town of Winter Park, 739 P.2d 862 (Colo. App. 1987) (local procedures cannot be used to circumvent statutory requirements)
- K9Shrink, LLC v. Ridgewood Meadows Water & Homeowners Ass’n, 278 P.3d 372 (Colo. App. 2012) (notice/standing can affect preclusion for issues actually decided)