802 F.3d 267
2d Cir.2015Background
- Seneca Nation used funds from the Seneca Nation Settlement Act (SNSA) to buy ~9 acres in Buffalo (the "Buffalo Parcel"); after notice and no adverse Secretary action the land became "restricted fee" under SNSA.
- Seneca entered a Nation-State gaming compact with New York permitting class III gaming on lands bought with SNSA funds; NIGC initially approved a gaming ordinance in 2002 but plaintiffs challenged agency review.
- Three lawsuits followed: CACGEC I (vacated original NIGC approval for failure to consider site-specific jurisdiction), CACGEC II (amended ordinance approved but later vacated by district court as to applicability of IGRA §20), and CACGEC III (after DOI rulemaking and Solicitor opinion, NIGC approved a second amended ordinance; district court dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge).
- DOI promulgated regulations and the Solicitor issued an opinion concluding IGRA §20 applies only to lands ‘‘taken in trust’’ (not restricted fee); NIGC relied on that analysis in approving the 2009 ordinance.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the district court in CACGEC III, holding the Buffalo Parcel is subject to tribal/federal jurisdiction, qualifies as IGRA "Indian lands," and IGRA §20’s prohibition does not apply to restricted-fee SNSA lands; earlier appeals were held moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Seneca has jurisdiction (Indian country) over the Buffalo Parcel | Parcel isn’t Indian country; New York jurisdiction remains | SNSA + Secretary’s actions set aside land for tribal use and impose federal superintendence | Congress intended SNSA restricted-fee lands to be set aside and under federal superintendence; Seneca has jurisdiction; NY divested |
| Whether the Buffalo Parcel is "Indian lands" under IGRA §2703(4)(B) | Even if restricted fee, Seneca hasn’t exercised governmental power over parcel | Seneca has exercised governmental power (marshals, signs, ordinances); restricted-fee + tribal power meet IGRA definition | NIGC’s finding that Seneca exercises governmental power was reasonable; parcel is "Indian lands" |
| Whether IGRA §20 bars gaming on the Buffalo Parcel (lands acquired after IGRA) | §20’s purpose is to bar gaming on after-acquired lands regardless of trust vs restricted fee; agencies’ new interpretation is arbitrary | §20’s text limits the ban to lands “acquired by the Secretary in trust”; restricted-fee SNSA lands are not "taken in trust" | §20’s plain text and statutory context limit it to lands taken into trust; DOI/NIGC interpretation reasonable; §20 does not apply |
| Mootness of earlier appeals (CACGEC I & II) | Plaintiffs sought relief tied to prior ordinances | Defendants point out 2009 ordinance supersedes earlier ones | Earlier ordinances were superseded by the 2009 approved ordinance; appeals of CACGEC I and II are moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (defines "dependent Indian community" as requiring federal set-aside and federal superintendence)
- City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (discusses limits on unilateral revival of tribal jurisdiction and describes IRA trust-acquisition process)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (standard for arbitrary and capricious review)
- Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (plain-meaning rule of statutory construction)
- United States v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (Non-Intercourse Act purpose and federal protection of Indian lands)
- Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (describes class III gaming as most closely regulated under IGRA)
- Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (describes IGRA’s allocation of regulatory roles among federal, state, and tribal governments)