CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.
589 U.S. 348
SCOTUS2020Background
- M/T Athos I, owned by Frescati and operated by Star Tankers, was subchartered to CARCO and struck an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River, spilling 264,000 gallons of crude oil.
- Under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) Frescati, as vessel owner, paid cleanup costs (limited statutorily) and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund reimbursed additional amounts; Frescati and the United States then sued CARCO to recover those costs.
- The dispute turned on a standard-form safe‑berth / safe‑port clause in the CARCO–Star subcharter (ASBATANKVOY language) requiring the charterer to designate a place or wharf "safe" such that the vessel can "proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat."
- Frescati and the U.S. argued the clause is an unqualified warranty of safety (liability regardless of diligence); CARCO argued it imposed only a due‑diligence obligation (no strict contractual liability absent negligence).
- The Third Circuit held Frescati an implied third‑party beneficiary and treated the clause as an express warranty of safety; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the clause imposed a warranty or only a due‑diligence duty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the safe‑berth clause creates an absolute warranty of safety or only a due‑diligence obligation | Safe‑berth is an unqualified warranty; charterer strictly liable for designating an unsafe berth | Clause imposes only a duty to exercise due diligence in selecting a safe berth; no strict contractual liability | Clause unambiguously creates a warranty of safety — charterer liable regardless of diligence |
| Whether absence of the word "warranty" defeats a warranty finding | Label is immaterial; material contractual statements are warranties regardless of label | Failure to use express warranty language shows parties did not intend a warranty | Label not required; a material assurance in the charter party can be a warranty |
| Whether the general exceptions clause ("perils of the sea") or pollution‑insurance clause relieves charterer of liability | Exceptions/insurance do not negate an express contractual provision imposing liability for selecting an unsafe berth | Exceptions or required insurance show parties did not intend charterer liability for such risks | Exceptions clause inapplicable where contract "otherwise . . . expressly provides" liability; insurance clause covers broader risks and does not negate warranty |
| Whether the master’s right to refuse entry / lighterage allocation creates conflict or limits charterer liability | Master’s right to refuse and lighterage allocation do not erase charterer’s warranty when vessel actually enters unsafe berth | Master’s textual rights indicate no separate charterer warranty; reading as a warranty creates conflicting obligations | No conflict: charterer must select a safe berth; master’s duty/right to load or refuse refers to whether master will enter that chosen berth and does not negate charterer’s warranty |
Key Cases Cited
- Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U.S. 40 (1885) (statements of material fact in a charter party can constitute warranties)
- Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S. 248 (1902) (master may refuse unsafe berth; charterer liable for resultant lighterage expenses)
- Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272 (1874) (discussed in opinion; District Court earlier found master waived safe‑berth protection)
- Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, 310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962) (Second Circuit treats unqualified safe‑berth language as an express warranty of safety)
- Orduna S.A. v. Zen‑Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990) (Fifth Circuit held a similar clause imposed a due‑diligence obligation)
- Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14 (2004) (maritime contracts construed by their terms; parties’ intent controls)
- Stolt‑Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (industry custom and usage may inform parties’ intent)
