2014 Ohio 168
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- Whicker obtained Ohio Mutual liability coverage for a 1996 Blazer in Feb 2010; Alassound, Whicker’s daughter, drove with Whicker’s permission despite a suspended license
- Alassound caused a Sept 9, 2010 crash with Flum; Alassound lacked a valid driver’s license at the time
- Cincinnati Insurance pursued the remaining $25,000 of Flum’s $75,000 judgment from Ohio Mutual
- Policy Exclusion A.9 excludes liability when an insured uses a vehicle without a reasonable belief of entitlement; A.9 does not apply to family members using the insured’s vehicle
- Exclusions A.9 and A.13 are contested; trial court granted Cincinnati’s summary judgment and denied Ohio Mutual’s summary judgment
- The appellate court remanded for factual development on knowledge of the insured regarding the suspended license
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Exclusion A.13 apply based on Whicker’s knowledge? | Ohio Mutual: Whicker knew Alassound’s license was suspended | Cincinnati: Whicker’s knowledge is insufficient or not proven | There is a genuine issue of material fact about Whicker’s knowledge; A.13 not conclusively applied; remand |
| Does Exclusion A.9 apply to bar coverage given a reasonable belief to drive? | Cincinnati: A.9 should bar coverage if not a family member | Ohio Mutual: A.9 does not apply because a reasonable belief existed | A.9 does not apply as a matter of law; but the outcome depends on A.13 on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Blount v. Kennard, 82 Ohio App.3d 613 (12th Dist.1992) (reasonable belief can exist despite knowledge of suspension; permission extent matters)
- Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166 ((1970)) (interpretation of insurance contracts; plain meaning rule; contraints on expansion of coverage)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St.3d 107 ((1984)) (contract interpretation; plain and ordinary meaning; liberality toward insured when ambiguity exists)
- Olmstead v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St.2d 212 ((1970)) (use of ordinary meaning in policy terms; strict against insurer when ambiguous)
- Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 76 Ohio St.3d 383 ((1996)) (summary judgment standard; evidence required for genuine issues of material fact)
- Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64 ((1978)) (summary judgment burden; no denials of facts without support)
- King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208 ((1988)) (contract interpretation; words given plain and ordinary meaning; contraints on insurer-imposed exclusions)
- Grizinski v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 393 (12th Dist.2010) (summary judgment de novo review; contract interpretation guidance)