Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306

The Buffalo Billion development program (administered via Fort Schuyler, a SUNY-affiliated nonprofit) became the center of a scheme to rig project awards.
Fort Schuyler board member Alain Kaloyeros and lobbyist Todd Howe used state funds and influence to secure control over project administration; LPCiminelli (Ciminelli's company) paid Howe for help obtaining contracts.
Kaloyeros, Howe, and Ciminelli collaborated to draft RFPs and a “preferred developer” selection process that singled out LPCiminelli, resulting in LPCiminelli winning the $750M Riverbend project.
Defendants were indicted for wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) and conspiracy; the Government prosecuted solely under the Second Circuit’s “right-to-control” theory—that depriving a victim of economically valuable information needed for discretionary decisions constitutes property loss.
The district court instructed the jury using that right-to-control formulation; the jury convicted Ciminelli, and the Second Circuit affirmed on the same theory.
The Supreme Court held the right-to-control theory invalid under the federal fraud statutes, reversed the Second Circuit, and remanded; it declined to affirm on an alternative theory sua sponte.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether depriving a victim of economically valuable information (the “right to control” information) qualifies as "property" under the wire fraud statute, § 1343	Gov't: right-to-control is a cognizable property interest; Fort Schuyler was deprived of valuable information needed to control assets	Ciminelli: the right to information is not a traditional property interest and thus cannot support § 1343 liability	The Court: right-to-control (information-only) is not a traditional property interest; it cannot form the basis for wire fraud liability — reversed and remanded
Whether the Supreme Court may affirm the convictions on an alternative property-fraud theory despite the Government conceding the right-to-control theory was erroneous	Gov't: evidence supports traditional property-fraud theory; Court can apply facts to that theory and affirm	Ciminelli: court should not reassess facts or substitute for jury; indictment and instructions tied to right-to-control theory	The Court: refused to affirm on an alternative theory because doing so would substitute appellate factfinding for the jury and trial court functions

Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (fraud statutes limited to protection of traditional property rights)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (mail/wire fraud confined to protection of property rights; curtailed expansive intangible-right theories)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (discussion of lower courts' prior expansion to intangible interests and limits)
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (property reference requires interests long recognized as property)
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991) (appellate courts should not affirm convictions on theories not presented to jury)
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (limits on novel fraud theories and necessity of appropriate jury findings)
United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991) (Second Circuit origin of right-to-control theory)
United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2015) (illustration of right-to-control application in Second Circuit)