Ciarpaglini v. Norwood
817 F.3d 541
7th Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Robert B. Ciarpaglini, an Illinois Medicaid beneficiary, sued challenging Illinois's 2012 statute requiring prior approval for reimbursement of more than four prescriptions in a 30-day period (the “four‑prescription limitation”).
- Ciarpaglini alleged the rule prevented him from obtaining necessary medications for multiple chronic mental-health conditions and caused severe harms.
- While the suit was pending, Illinois moved Ciarpaglini from fee‑for‑service Medicaid (where the cap applied) into a managed‑care program that does not apply the cap to him.
- The district court dismissed his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot because he was no longer subject to the cap; Ciarpaglini appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit found the existing record inadequate to resolve mootness — in particular, whether the transfer was part of a broad, countywide/statewide managed‑care roll‑out (which would likely moot the case) or an individualized change (which could leave the controversy live).
- The court remanded for limited fact‑finding on (1) whether the transfer was part of a broader policy (voluntary cessation analysis) and (2) the sincerity/circumstances of Ciarpaglini’s stated intent to move to a county where the cap would apply, and retained jurisdiction pending that fact‑finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness via voluntary cessation | The move to managed care is temporary or individualized; state could reimpose the cap on him, so case remains live | Transfer removed his exposure to the cap, and the transfer reflects a broader policy shift to managed care, so no reasonable expectation of recurrence | Record insufficient; remand for fact‑finding whether transfer was part of a broad policy (voluntary cessation unresolved) |
| Capable of repetition yet evading review | Even if transferred now, he may be subject to the cap again (e.g., by moving counties), so exception should apply | The controversy is not inherently transitory and ordinary litigation can address future recurrence | Court said exception likely depends on same factual inquiry as voluntary cessation; remand to resolve facts |
| Pre‑enforcement standing to challenge law in adjacent county | He intends to move to Stephenson County where cap would apply; that deterrence to movement gives standing for a pre‑enforcement challenge | His desire to move is speculative and may not confer standing; concerns about third‑party/outsider suits | Court found the record minimal and ordered limited fact‑finding on sincerity/obstacles to his stated desire to move |
| Other damages/immunity claims dismissed below | (N/A for injunctive mootness) | Defendants prevailed below on immunity and failure‑to‑state for certain damages claims | Appeals on those claims deferred; Seventh Circuit will resolve them after remand fact‑finding |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (used to state standard that mootness requires it be "absolutely clear" the wrongful behavior will not recur)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (defendant bears heavy burden to show no reasonable expectation of recurrence)
- Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (transfer of plaintiffs did not moot ADA claims where placements had been repeatedly reversed)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (standing/mootness principles in injunction suits)
- United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (defendant cannot moot case by voluntary cessation if likely to resume conduct)
- Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 708 F.3d 921 (Seventh Circuit precedent on voluntary cessation and reasonable expectation standard)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (articulation of capable‑of‑repetition‑yet‑evading‑review test)
- Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (definition and application of the capable‑of‑repetition exception)