303 Ga. 358
Ga.2018Background
- Four-year-old Remington Walden died after a 2012 rear-end collision caused his Jeep's rear-mounted fuel tank to rupture and ignite; his parents sued Chrysler (vehicle manufacturer) and the driver for wrongful death.
- Plaintiffs alleged Chrysler's rear-axle fuel-tank design was dangerous and that Chrysler acted with willful, reckless, or wanton disregard (to avoid Georgia's ten-year repose).
- Plaintiffs emphasized that NHTSA's ODI had investigated and recommended a recall of similar Jeeps in 2009, and alleged CEO Sergio Marchionne influenced NHTSA to exclude the model at issue.
- Marchionne testified and denied improper influence; plaintiffs then elicited testimony from Chrysler’s COO about Marchionne’s compensation (over $68 million) to show bias; trial court overruled Chrysler's objections.
- Jury awarded $150 million (later reduced by court); Chrysler appealed, arguing compensation evidence should have been excluded under Georgia common-law ban on party-wealth evidence and/or Rule 403.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide admissibility of executive-compensation evidence to show witness bias under the new Evidence Code and whether the remitted award review was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence of a witness's compensation (non-party CEO) is always admissible to show bias under OCGA § 24-6-622 | Such evidence is admissible to show bias and credibility; CEO’s pay made bias probative given alleged interference with NHTSA. | Compensation is effectively party-wealth evidence and should be excluded under the longstanding common-law prohibition (or otherwise irrelevant/prejudicial). | Evidence of a witness's compensation may be admissible to show bias, but is subject to Rule 401/402 relevance and Rule 403 unfair-prejudice balancing; Rule 622 does not automatically override Rule 403. |
| Whether Georgia's old common-law rule barring party-wealth evidence continues to bar evidence of employee/executive compensation | N/A (plaintiffs relied on bias admissibility) | The common-law ban on evidence of a party's wealth should bar executive-compensation evidence as derivative. | The common-law party-wealth rule has been superseded where the new Evidence Code covers the topic; it does not independently bar non-party compensation evidence. |
| Standard of review where defendant objected on different grounds (relevancy/party-wealth) but did not invoke Rule 403 | N/A | Objection on relevance/party-wealth should preserve review that compensation was unduly prejudicial. | Because Chrysler did not timely raise a Rule 403/unfair-prejudice objection, review is for plain error rather than ordinary abuse-of-discretion. |
| Whether admission of Marchionne’s compensation was reversible error under plain-error standard | N/A | Admission was prejudicial and irrelevant; should have been excluded, warranting reversal. | Under the facts (CEO conduct central to claim and credibility), the Court could not say the admission was clear, obvious reversible error; judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (Rule 402 provides baseline when interpreting federal evidence rules)
- BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, 955 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.) (evidence of nonparty chairman's income admissible to show bias)
- Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (net-worth evidence risks jury using verdicts to express bias against large corporations)
- Whittenburg v. Werner Enters., 561 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir.) (comments on party wealth are highly prejudicial and can warrant reversal)
- Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276 (2017) (Georgia Evidence Code modeled on Federal Rules; federal precedent persuasive)
- Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65 (2016) (exclusion under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy; to be used sparingly)