Christopher Shawn Linton v. United States, 712 F. App'x 920

Christopher Shawn Linton pleaded guilty to multiple fraud and money-laundering offenses and was sentenced to 71 months; the district court ordered placement in a facility able to address his mental-health needs.
Linton provided his lawyer with a list of treating physicians and said he was bipolar; counsel submitted a letter from Dr. Steve Bonner stating Linton "had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder," but did not present or secure other medical records (e.g., Dr. Narithookil S. Xavier).
The presentence report listed depression, bipolar disorder, and two prior suicide attempts; the district court treated those facts as established for sentencing but said it was "not convinced" Linton actually had bipolar disorder.
On direct appeal Linton raised ineffective-assistance claims; this Court held the record permitted resolution and affirmed, concluding the district court accounted for Linton’s mental-health issues when fashioning sentence. United States v. Linton, 601 F. App’x 914.
Linton filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging (1) counsel failed to object to the district court’s treatment of Dr. Bonner’s letter and (2) counsel failed to investigate/present medical records establishing bipolar disorder. The district court dismissed both as barred; this Court granted a COA on whether the investigation claim was procedurally defaulted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether failure-to-investigate ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted	Linton: claim required factual development (medical records not in record) and was unavailable on direct appeal	Government: claim was available on direct appeal and thus defaulted	Not defaulted — evidence not in the record, so claim was not available on direct appeal
Whether counsel’s failure to investigate prejudiced Linton under Strickland	Linton: had counsel obtained records proving bipolar disorder, there is reasonable probability of a lower sentence	Government: district court already accounted for mental-health issues; no reasonable probability of different result	No prejudice — district court considered mental-health factors; Linton cannot show reasonable probability of different sentence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: performance and prejudice)
McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for § 2255 and procedural-default principles)
Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994) (issue is "available" on direct appeal if merits can be reviewed without further factual development)
Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (claims raised and rejected on direct appeal are barred in § 2255)
Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2014) (ineffective-assistance claims are mixed questions reviewed de novo; Strickland prejudice standard)
Spencer v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 609 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2010) (review of procedural bars in habeas context)
LeCroy v. United States, 739 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2014) (appellate court may affirm on any record-supported basis)
United States v. Linton, [citation="601 F. App'x 914"] (11th Cir. 2015) (direct-appeal decision rejecting Linton’s objection argument because district court accounted for mental-health issues)