341 So.3d 941
Miss.2022Background:
- Christopher Strickland Jr., a high‑school cross‑country runner, was stung by a wasp before a meet; he told coaches, who (and a bystander nurse) examined him and observed no signs of an adverse reaction; a coach told him to “man up.”
- Christopher ran the race, later felt dizzy, fell and hit his head; he initially recovered on site but later medical exams revealed brain and spine injuries.
- Christopher’s father sued Rankin County School District (RCSD) alleging negligence for allowing him to run after the sting and for the district’s post‑fall response (plaintiff later abandoned the post‑fall claim for lack of medical causation evidence).
- RCSD moved for summary judgment invoking discretionary‑function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act §11‑46‑9(1)(d); the trial court granted summary judgment, finding either immunity or no genuine issue of negligent conduct.
- The Court of Appeals split, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding plaintiff failed to allege or present a triable negligence claim, rendering the discretionary‑function immunity question moot.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether coaches’ decision to let Christopher run after a wasp sting states a triable negligence claim (duty, breach, causation, damages) | Strickland: coaches acted with ordinary negligence by allowing him to run despite his complaint | RCSD: no actionable negligence; evidence shows no signs of reaction and no proximate causation | No triable negligence; plaintiff failed to show breach causing injury — summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether RCSD/coaches are protected by MTCA discretionary‑function immunity (§11‑46‑9(1)(d)) | Strickland: coaches’ actions were run‑of‑the‑mill negligence, not policy decisions | RCSD: coaches’ decisions implicate policy (first‑aid training, athletic program management) and are immune | Court declined to decide (moot) because no underlying tort was pled/proven; immunity not reached on merits |
| Procedural fairness of granting summary judgment on grounds not raised by movant (notice/record sufficiency) | Strickland (and dissent/concurrence): unfair to fault plaintiff for lack of evidence on an issue he was not put on notice to defend | RCSD: moved for summary judgment and identified deficiencies after discovery; court had record to resolve merits | Majority: de novo review supports decision; concurrence agreed result but criticized notice issue and would remand if fairness required |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilcher v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177 (Miss. 2018) (readopts two‑part public‑policy test for discretionary‑function immunity and emphasizes identifying the specific act at issue)
- Jones v. Miss. Dep’t of Transp., 744 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1999) (adopts Gaubert public‑policy framework for immunity analysis)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (establishes federal two‑part discretionary‑function test focusing on policy considerations)
- Harris ex rel. Harris v. McCray, 867 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 2003) (discusses public‑policy implications of imposing liability for coaching decisions)
- Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Magee, 29 So. 3d 1 (Miss. 2010) (holds certain school coaching/athletic program decisions implicate policy)
- Pratt v. Gulfport‑Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68 (Miss. 2012) (criticized in Wilcher for overextending policy reach)
- Karpinsky v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84 (Miss. 2013) (summary judgment burden and nonmovant’s obligation to produce evidence)
- Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough, 212 So. 3d 69 (Miss. 2017) (elements of negligence and proximate causation)