Christopher Reed v. Bradley A. Friedman, P.A.
859 F. App’x 498
| 11th Cir. | 2021Background
- Christopher Reed and Rosenna Reed registered the fictitious business name “Reed’s Enterprise” under Florida law; Reed purchased a condominium managed by Star Lakes Association.
- Star Lakes hired Bradley A. Friedman, P.A. to collect unpaid maintenance and special-assessment fees for the unit. Friedman sent letters addressed to “Reed’s Enterprise.”
- Reed sued under the FDCPA and Florida law, alleging deceptive debt-collection practices and disputing the amounts demanded.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing, submitting extrinsic documents (collection letters) showing the debts were sought from Reed’s Enterprise, not Christopher Reed personally.
- The district court, treating the motion as a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), found the collection efforts targeted Reed’s Enterprise (owned by two people) and dismissed Reed’s complaint without prejudice for lack of standing; it alternatively found failure to state a claim but the court below did not reach the merits.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: it held the district court properly considered extrinsic evidence in a factual attack, its factual finding that Reed and Reed’s Enterprise were not interchangeable was not clearly erroneous, and Reed abandoned any challenge to that finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to bring FDCPA claim when debt collection targeted a fictitious name entity | Reed: Florida law treats a fictitious name as having no independent legal existence, so Reed is the same party as Reed’s Enterprise | Defendants: collection efforts were directed to Reed’s Enterprise; extrinsic evidence shows debt owed by the entity, not Reed personally | Court affirmed dismissal for lack of standing; district court properly considered extrinsic evidence and its factual finding that Reed and Reed’s Enterprise are not coextensive was not clearly erroneous and unchallenged by Reed |
| Whether complaint stated an FDCPA claim because the debt is a "consumer debt" and/or a "consumer" must be a natural person | Reed: (implicitly) his allegations asserted deceptive collection practices that state a claim under FDCPA | Defendants: the debt is owed by an entity and a fictitious name is not a natural person; thus FDCPA does not apply | Court did not reach merits because dismissal for lack of standing was dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (de novo review of dismissal for lack of Article III standing)
- Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (review jurisdictional factual findings for clear error; courts may consider extrinsic evidence in factual attacks)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (party invoking federal jurisdiction bears burden to establish standing)
- Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (factual attacks under Rule 12(b)(1) may consider matters outside the pleadings)
- SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2010) (extrinsic documents central to a claim and authentic may be considered on a motion to dismiss)
- Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (failure to challenge a district-court factual finding on appeal constitutes abandonment)