Christopher Ray Counts, 338 P.3d 902

In 2011 a jury convicted Christopher Counts of aggravated burglary and kidnapping and found him a habitual criminal based on three prior felonies, one committed when he was 16.
Under the pre-2013 habitual offender statute, three prior convictions required a life sentence; Counts received concurrent life terms and this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
After Miller v. Alabama, which forbids mandatory life-without-parole for juvenile offenders without individualized consideration, Wyoming later applied Miller to juvenile-equivalent life sentences (Bear Cloud III).
The legislature amended the habitual-offender statute effective July 1, 2013 to make juvenile convictions ineligible as predicates for the life enhancement (i.e., prior offenses must be committed after age 18).
Counts moved under Rule 35(a) to correct an illegal sentence, arguing Miller invalidated use of his juvenile conviction as a predicate and that the 2013 amendment should apply retroactively; the district court denied relief.
This appeal raises (1) brief-compliance procedural objections, (2) whether Miller bars using juvenile convictions to enhance adult habitual sentences to life, and (3) whether the 2013 amendment must be applied retroactively to Counts.

Issue	Counts' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Should court refuse review because Counts’ brief violated W.R.A.P. 7.01?	Brief deficiencies notwithstanding, Court should reach merits because issue is clear and important.	Brief is substandard and warrants summary affirmance.	Court declined to summarily affirm and reached the merits.
Does Miller prohibit using a juvenile conviction as a predicate to enhance an adult offender’s sentence to life under the habitual-offender statute?	Miller prohibits mandatory life sentences arising from juvenile offenses; using a juvenile predicate here made Counts’ life sentence unconstitutional.	Miller concerns juveniles being sentenced for juvenile offenses; it does not govern adult enhancements based on criminal history.	Miller does not apply to adult sentences enhanced to life under a habitual-offender scheme; enhancement punished the adult current offense, not the juvenile predicate.
Must the 2013 amendment (excluding juvenile predicates) be applied retroactively to require resentencing?	The amendment reflects recognition of constitutional infirmity and should be applied retroactively to avoid manifest injustice.	The amendment is substantive, has a future effective date and contains no retroactivity clause; it does not apply to finally decided cases.	The amendment is substantive and not retroactive; Counts is not entitled to resentencing.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders without individualized consideration)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles are categorically different for most severe penalties)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles unconstitutional)
Counts v. State, 277 P.3d 94 (Wyo. 2012) (direct appeal affirming Counts’ convictions and habitual status)
Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (applying Miller to require individualized sentencing when juvenile faces functional life-without-parole)
U.S. v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2013) (Miller inapplicable to adult offenders whose enhancements rely on juvenile predicates)
State v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (refusing to extend Miller to recidivist sentencing using juvenile convictions as predicates)