762 F.3d 579
7th Cir.2014Background
- Mosley was convicted at a bench trial of first-degree murder and arson based on testimony that he ordered others to set an apartment on fire; he received consecutive lengthy prison terms.
- Defense called one witness (Ishi Coward) placing Mosley in a schoolyard; the trial judge discredited Coward and credited the State’s witness, Marlo Fernando.
- Postconviction affidavits from Sharon Taylor and Keely Jones said Mosley was in the schoolyard when the fire started and that Taylor saw him earlier in her apartment; both claimed they tried to contact defense counsel but were not called at trial.
- A federal habeas evidentiary hearing produced testimony consistent with those affidavits; the district court originally granted relief but limited some analysis after Cullen v. Pinholster.
- The Seventh Circuit previously held the state court’s denial was unreasonable under § 2254(d) and remanded for the district court to make independent § 2254(a) findings based on the additional evidence.
- On remand the district court again granted habeas relief, finding trial counsel Robert Strunck’s failure to investigate and call Taylor (and not preparing a defense if the acquittal motion failed) objectively unreasonable and prejudicial; the Seventh Circuit affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Mosley’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper federal standard on remand (§ 2254(a) vs § 2254(d)) | District court should independently decide whether custody is unconstitutional under § 2254(a) using the evidentiary record on remand | District court erred by referring to § 2254(d) and state-court unreasonableness instead of making an independent § 2254(a) determination | Court: district court’s language mistakenly referenced § 2254(d) but it performed the required § 2254(a) independent review; no abuse of discretion in denying Rule 59(e) motion |
| Whether counsel’s omission was strategic (performance prong) | Strunck failed to investigate Taylor and Jones; decision not to call Taylor was uninformed and thus not entitled to deference | Strunck listed Taylor as a witness and asked an investigator to contact her; therefore he must have known her testimony and made a strategic choice | Court: Strunck did not recall contacting Taylor, had no notes, and was unaware of her exculpatory facts; failure to investigate made the omission objectively unreasonable |
| Prejudice under Strickland | Absent Strunck’s failures, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would differ because Taylor’s testimony would have corroborated Coward and undermined Fernando | State: trial judge discredited alternative testimony; adding Taylor would not likely have changed the verdict | Court: reasonable probability of a different result; Taylor’s testimony would have bolstered defense on the critical issue (Mosley’s location), so prejudice shown |
| Clear-error challenge to district factual findings | N/A (Mosley) | State contends several factual findings (e.g., what Taylor would say; Strunck’s knowledge) are implausible or contradicted by the record | Court: factual findings are not clearly erroneous; district court heard witnesses and its credibility-based conclusions are permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits review under § 2254(d)(1) to the state-court record)
- Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (earlier Seventh Circuit opinion holding state-court denial unreasonable and remanding for § 2254(a) determination)
- Stitts v. Wilson, 713 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2013) (discusses district court’s duties on independent § 2254(a) review)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (standard for reviewing factual findings and credibility determinations)