Christopher Mitchell v. United States, 43 F.4th 608

Background:

Mitchell pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to a 15-year mandatory minimum based on three prior Tennessee burglary convictions.
Years later Mitchell moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing Tennessee aggravated burglary no longer qualified as an ACCA violent felony based on then-recent Sixth Circuit en banc decision (Stitt I); the district court granted the motion and began resentencing.
The Supreme Court reversed Stitt I in Stitt II, holding Tennessee aggravated burglary falls within generic burglary for ACCA purposes; the Sixth Circuit thereafter treated Nance as the controlling law again.
After Stitt II, the district court vacated its grant of § 2255 relief, denied Mitchell’s § 2255 motion, and reinstated the original 15-year sentence; Mitchell sought reconsideration and concurrent sentencing but was denied.
On appeal Mitchell argued the district court nevertheless had discretion to resentence after the earlier vacatur and sought expansion of his certificate of appealability to raise a Sixth Amendment/Apprendi challenge to the court’s use of Shepard documents to find the prior offenses were on different occasions.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed: once the district court concluded Mitchell was not entitled to § 2255 relief it lacked authority to modify the valid original sentence; the request to expand the certificate of appealability was denied as procedurally defaulted and meritless.

Issues:

Issue	Mitchell's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court could resentence Mitchell after it vacated and then reinstated denial of his §2255 motion	Court had discretion to finish resentencing because it previously vacated the original sentence	Once §2255 relief was denied, the court lacked authority to modify a valid sentence and must reinstate the original sentence	Court must reinstate original sentence; no resentencing after denial of §2255 relief
Whether Tennessee aggravated burglary qualifies as an ACCA violent felony	Mitchell: Tennessee aggravated burglary (and Class D burglary) do not qualify	Government: Stitt II and circuit precedent control; the convictions are ACCA predicates	Circuit precedent (post-Stitt II) forecloses Mitchell’s challenge; ACCA applies
Whether using Shepard documents to find prior offenses occurred on "different occasions" violated the Sixth Amendment (Apprendi)	Mitchell: Judge erred by using Shepard documents rather than jury findings to establish the different-occasions fact	Govt: Claim is procedurally defaulted and, in any event, Shepard documents and plea facts establish different occasions so no prejudice	COA not expanded: claim procedurally defaulted; alternatively no prejudice shown
Whether to expand Mitchell’s certificate of appealability to allow the Shepard/Apprendi claim	Mitchell sought expansion to present the Sixth Amendment claim on appeal	Govt opposed; argued procedural default and binding precedent bar relief	Court declined to expand COA

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (Supreme Court 2018) (held Tennessee aggravated burglary falls within generic burglary for ACCA)
Brumbach v. United States, 929 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2019) (reinstituted pre-Stitt circuit law recognizing Tennessee burglary as ACCA predicate)
United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2007) (earlier Sixth Circuit holding Tennessee aggravated burglary a violent felony)
United States v. Ferguson, 868 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2017) (held Class D Tennessee burglary is a violent felony)
Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2016) (describing §2255 entitlement inquiry and remedies)
United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2009) (district courts lack inherent authority to modify an otherwise valid sentence)
United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2010) (if §2255 fails, petition must be denied and original sentence stands)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (jury factfinding rule: any fact other than prior conviction increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (cause standard to excuse procedural default)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (failure to raise claim on direct appeal generally constitutes procedural default)
Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022) (adopted a multi-factor framework for the "different occasions" inquiry under §924(e))