Christopher Mielo v. Steak N Shake Operations Inc
897 F.3d 467
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Two disability-rights advocates (Mielo and Heinzl) sued Steak ’n Shake under Title III of the ADA alleging accessibility defects (particularly in parking facilities) at multiple restaurants; each plaintiff alleges concrete difficulty ambulating in a wheelchair at one Steak ’n Shake location.
- Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief ordering Steak ’n Shake to adopt corporate ADA-compliance policies and to remediate barriers across ~417 company-controlled locations.
- District Court certified a nationwide Rule 23(b)(2) class of mobility-disabled persons who encountered accessibility barriers at any Steak ’n Shake location where defendant owns/controls parking.
- Steak ’n Shake appealed class certification under Rule 23(f); the Third Circuit reviews certification for abuse of discretion and legal questions de novo.
- The panel analyzed Article III standing (injury in fact, traceability, redressability) and Rule 23(a) requirements (numerosity, commonality) and concluded plaintiffs have standing but the certified class fails Rule 23(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (overall) | Mielo/Heinzl say they suffered concrete harms (physical difficulty ambulating; deterrence) caused by Steak ’n Shake’s corporate policies and seek injunctive relief | Steak ’n Shake contends plaintiffs assert only procedural violations (lack of policy) and lack standing to seek wide-ranging relief for locations they did not visit | Court: Plaintiffs have standing — alleged concrete, particularized past injuries and deterrence; traceability/redressability sufficiently pled at pleading stage; merits not decided |
| Injury-in-fact: procedural-policy v. concrete harm | Plaintiffs argue lack of an ADA compliance policy caused real-world harms (ambulatory difficulty) and that policy relief would remedy injuries | Steak ’n Shake argues mere absence of policy is a bare procedural violation insufficient for concreteness under Spokeo/Cottrell | Held: Mere absence of policy alone is insufficient, but plaintiffs also allege concrete physical harms (ambulating difficulties) satisfying concreteness and particularization requirements |
| Traceability & Redressability | Plaintiffs claim corporate policies caused the barriers (traceability) and that injunctive relief requiring inspections/training/policies would likely lead to remediation (redressability) | Steak ’n Shake points out causal gaps and that ordering policies—without guaranteed remediation—may not redress specific slope defects | Held: Traceability satisfied at pleading stage (indirect causation ok); redressability met because injunctive measures and retained jurisdiction make remediation likely enough for standing |
| Rule 23(a) — Numerosity and Commonality | Plaintiffs assert large pool of potential class members (millions of persons with mobility disabilities; company presence; executive’s remark) and seek classwide injunctive relief | Steak ’n Shake argues class is overbroad, speculative as to number of injured class members, and includes many distinct ADA violations across facilities undermining commonality | Held: Class certification reversed. Numerosity not shown by non-specific census data or perfunctory corporate comment (speculation). Commonality fails because certified class sweeps many different types of ADA violations that do not raise a single common contention capable of classwide resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (statutory/ procedural violations must cause concrete injury to satisfy standing)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plaintiff bears burden to establish standing elements)
- Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remedy must be limited to redressing the established injury)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
- In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008) (rigorous, fact-based Rule 23 analysis; Eisenberg’s relaxed standard no longer controls)
- Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2015) (only class representative must have Article III standing)
- Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012) (numerosity requires factual showing; avoid speculation)
- Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2013) (numerosity burden by preponderance; need circumstantial evidence specific to class)
- Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (Spokeo guidance on separating standing and merits inquiries)
- Finkelman v. National Football League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016) (standing traceability discussion)