Christopher Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 24-2761

Christopher Massey, a white male and longtime Bergenfield police officer, was denied promotion to Chief in favor of Mustafa Rabboh. 1
Bergenfield’s Council voted on promotions, and in 2019 the relevant vote was cast by Amatorio, Deauna, Kornbluth, Marte, and Rivera. 2
During the selection process, officials made race-related remarks, including that the decision was “all about race” and that it was important to have a minority department head. 3
The Council formally promoted Rabboh, and officials publicly emphasized Bergenfield’s diversity and Rabboh’s status as the first Muslim police chief. 4
Massey sued under the NJLAD, § 1983, and § 1981, but the District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims. 5

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Ames abrogate NJLAD’s Background Circumstances Rule? 6	Massey argued the rule is incompatible with NJLAD’s text.	Bergenfield relied on Erickson’s heightened prima facie burden.	Yes; the rule no longer applies under NJLAD. 7
Was summary judgment proper on Massey’s NJLAD claim? 8	Massey pointed to direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive.	Bergenfield said Rabboh was better qualified and promoted for legitimate reasons.	No; genuine disputes required a trial. 9
Was summary judgment proper on the § 1983 equal-protection claim? 10	Massey claimed intentional discrimination violated equal protection.	Bergenfield said employment race claims cannot proceed under § 1983.	No; the equal-protection § 1983 claim survives. 11
Was Massey’s § 1981 claim viable against Bergenfield? 12	Massey argued he could proceed against the Borough on a Monell theory.	Bergenfield said § 1983 is the exclusive remedy against state actors.	No; the § 1981 claim failed. 13

Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) (adopted the Background Circumstances Rule for NJLAD reverse-discrimination claims 14)
Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (U.S. 2025) (rejected the Background Circumstances Rule under Title VII 15)
Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejected the federal Background Circumstances Rule as unnecessary and vague 16)
Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1978) (applied McDonnell Douglas to New Jersey discrimination claims 17)
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 867 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 2005) (explains NJLAD prima facie and pretext burdens 18)
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (pretext can be shown by discrediting employer reasons or showing discriminatory motive 19)
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (U.S. 1989) (§ 1983 provides the exclusive damages remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors 20)
McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizes the possibility of a Monell-based § 1981-related claim through § 1983 21)