Christopher Leverson v. State, 03-15-00090-CR

Background

Christopher Leverson (pro se) was stopped Dec. 20, 2012 and charged in Austin Municipal Court with expired registration, failure to display a driver’s license, and failure to maintain financial responsibility; he did not receive citations and disputes service and the form of the charging instrument.
Leverson invoked the Fifth Amendment during the stop when officers requested license and insurance; officers later found his license during a vehicle search.
Municipal court convicted Leverson; Travis County Court at Law No. 1 affirmed; Leverson appealed to the Third Court of Appeals and filed the presented merits brief.
Central factual dispute: prosecutor used an offense/incident report at trial that Leverson had requested in discovery; the trial judge ruled the report was work product and admittted testimony based on it despite prior discovery orders.
Core legal claims on appeal: (1) municipal courts of record must follow Government Code Chapter 30 appointment/central-docket rules; (2) a complaint (filed by a clerk) is not a proper charging instrument sufficient to vest jurisdiction; (3) the Texas Transportation Code regulates commercial “transportation” only, so it does not apply to private non‑commercial travel; (4) Leverson’s invocation of the right to remain silent cannot be used to justify additional charges; (5) failure to produce the offense report required exclusion and warrants reversal or mistrial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Leverson)	Defendant's Argument (State / Appellate courts)	Held
1. Must municipal courts of record follow statutes (Gov’t Code ch. 30) about presiding judge/central docket?	Chapter 30 requires a presiding judge and assigned docket; failure to follow produces due process harms ("round‑robin" judges).	State/appellate courts treated central‑docket practice as permissible for efficiency and found no statutory harm shown.	Appellate courts rejected reversal for this ground — they found no demonstrated, reversible harm from central docket handling.
2. Is a clerk’s complaint a proper charging instrument that vests jurisdiction?	A complaint filed by a clerk is not an information/indictment required by the Constitution and CCP; complaints lack statutory requisites and cannot substitute as the State’s initial pleading.	State and municipal/appellate courts held that CCP ch. 45 complaints operate in municipal court and can serve as the charging instrument under current municipal practice and case law.	Appellate courts held the municipal complaint sufficed in municipal court practice; Leverson’s contention that no indictment/information existed was not a basis for reversal.
3. Does the Transportation Code only regulate commercial “transportation” so it did not apply to Leverson’s private travel?	"Transportation" is commercial (carrying people/property for hire); statutory definitions reference transportation; Leverson was not engaged in regulated commercial activity, so no personal jurisdiction or regulatory applicability.	State/courts applied the Transportation Code and its definitions to regulate driving on public roads; they rejected narrowing transportation to commerce-only for ordinary traffic offenses.	Appellate courts rejected Leverson’s narrow commercial‑only reading and treated the cited traffic statutes as applicable to private driving; no jurisdictional defect found on that basis.
4. Can invocation of the Fifth Amendment be punished by additional charges or custody?	Leverson reasonably believed production of license/insurance could be incriminating and invoked the right; penalizing or arresting him for that invocation violates Miranda/Hoffman and due process.	State argued production of license/insurance on demand is required under statute when probable cause exists and that evidence was not privileged (or was exculpatory), and refusal did not immunize defendant.	Appellate courts held refusal to produce required documents did not make reversal appropriate; they did not accept that invocation alone required dismissal of statutory charges.
5. Did the prosecutor’s failure to produce the offense report (required by discovery order) and the trial judge’s work‑product ruling require exclusion and reversal?	The prosecutor falsely claimed no report; the report was ordered produced; its late revelation prejudiced Leverson — mandatory exclusion and mistrial or reversal required.	The trial judge characterized the report as work product (not discoverable); the appellate court termed that ruling "entirely erroneous" but conducted a harm analysis and found any error harmless in the record.	Appellate court acknowledged error in the trial court’s ruling and prosecutor’s conduct but concluded the error was harmless and did not warrant reversal.

Key Cases Cited

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (minimum contacts/personal jurisdiction)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (right to remain silent and protection against compelled self‑incrimination)
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (scope of Fifth Amendment protection against producing evidence)
Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992) (failure to respond to discovery and exclusion/remedies)
Labelle v. State, 720 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (charging instruments, indictment/information v. other documents)