Christopher Johnston v. State of Indiana, 69 N.E.3d 507

Johnston repeatedly contacted D.K. via calls, texts, and Facebook despite a 2014 protective order; arrested after visiting her home in Feb. and March 2015.
State charged Johnston with multiple stalking and invasion-of-privacy counts; one stalking count rested solely on Facebook messages from several alleged alias accounts.
IMPD Computer and Digital Forensic Unit Sergeant Steven Schafer analyzed D.K.’s phone and multiple Facebook accounts; he identified common IP addresses and cookies linking several accounts to the same device.
Schafer was presented and qualified as an expert in forensic analysis of social media records and digital trails; Johnston objected to his qualification as to linking accounts to Johnston.
On re-direct, Schafer gave a colorful analogy (the “polar bear” analogy) to describe the improbability that multiple people used the same device/IP to send similar messages; Johnston did not object to that specific analogy at trial.
Trial court convicted Johnston; on appeal he challenged (1) Schafer’s expert qualification and (2) admission of the polar bear/statistical analogy as unreliable opinion testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sergeant Schafer was qualified as an expert to opine on social media/digital-trail analysis	State: Schafer’s training, Secret Service classes, ICAC training, and 300+ case experience qualify him to aid the trier of fact on internet technology and social media forensics	Johnston: Schafer lacked requisite statistical training and thus was unqualified to opine on linking accounts or probability matters	Court: No abuse of discretion — Schafer properly qualified as an expert in forensic analysis of social media and digital trails (not as a statistician)
Whether admission of Schafer’s “polar bear” analogy (statistical improbability) was erroneous and, if unobjected, rises to fundamental error	State: Schafer used an analogy to explain unlikelihood; he did not offer formal statistical analysis; evidence (common IPs/cookies) supported inference	Johnston: Analogy was not based on reliable scientific principles and prejudiced his defense; his failure to object preserved only fundamental-error review	Court: Not fundamental error — bench trial presumption of judicial temperance, other admissible evidence tied accounts together, and no showing the court relied improperly on the analogy

Hastings v. State, 58 N.E.3d 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (expert testimony must be related to a field beyond average-person knowledge and aid trier of fact)
INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 709 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (trial court has broad discretion to qualify experts; reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Sparkman v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (appellate court will affirm expert-qualification if any evidence supports trial court’s decision)
Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (qualification of an expert is within trial court’s sound discretion)
Armstrong v. State, 22 N.E.3d 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (officer’s training/experience can qualify him as an expert on specialized topics)
Julian v. State, 811 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (admission of opinion testimony is within trial court’s discretion)
Davis v. State, 791 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (trial court must be satisfied expert testimony rests on reliable principles; appellate reversal requires manifest abuse resulting in denial of fair trial)
Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939 (Ind. 2008) (fundamental error standard is narrow and applies only to egregious violations preventing a fair trial)
Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1990) (bench-trial presumption that judge decides based only on relevant, probative evidence)
Newbill v. State, 884 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (no reversal for admission of evidence absent proof of fundamental error or prejudice)