Christopher Jaroszewicz v. Texas Department of Public Safety
03-15-00340-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 19, 2015Background
- Appellant Christopher Jaroszewicz was arrested for DWI on Oct. 11, 2014, and refused breath/blood testing; DPS administratively suspended his license after an ALR hearing.
- At the ALR hearing the arresting officer did not testify; the Department relied on the officer’s written DIC-23 (arrest affidavit) as its sole evidence.
- The DIC-23 contained two short statements: the officer observed Jaroszewicz traveling "at a high rate of speed" in a 30 mph zone and "measured the speed at 45 mph using Doppler radar."
- Appellant objected at the ALR hearing to admission of the DIC-23 material challenging both the officer’s written speed observation and the radar statement.
- The ALJ found reasonable suspicion and probable cause, authorized a two-year suspension; the county court at law affirmed on substantial-evidence review. Appellant appeals arguing the written statements were inadmissible and insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jaroszewicz) | Defendant's Argument (DPS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preservation of error | Objection to DIC-23 (radar and "high rate of speed") sufficiently preserved error under cases allowing general objections when grounds are obvious | Department maintained objection was insufficiently specific | Court was urged that objection was adequate (appellant relied on Rule and caselaw supporting general objections in context) |
| Admissibility of radar evidence (Kelly test) | One-sentence DIC-23 reference to Doppler radar was insufficient evidence to satisfy Kelly prongs 2 and 3 (technique and proper application) because the officer did not testify or provide calibration/training info | DPS would argue radar evidence is admissible and radar theory is established; officer’s affidavit sufficed | Appellant argued radar evidence should have been excluded for failure to prove officer’s training, calibration, and application at hearing |
| Sufficiency of non‑testifying officer’s written speed observation | A conclusory written statement that vehicle traveled at a "high rate of speed" lacks specific articulable facts and the officer’s experience needed to establish reasonable suspicion | DPS relied on the officer’s written conclusion as fact evidence supporting the stop | Appellant contended the written legal conclusion, without testimony or factual detail, did not meet reasonable‑suspicion standard |
| Standard of review / remedy | ALR decision must be supported by substantial evidence; where only inadmissible or conclusory evidence supports findings, court should reverse/remand | DPS pointed to ALJ and county court findings and record certifying substantial evidence | Appellant sought reversal and reinstatement of license arguing administrative findings were not reasonably supported by reliable, probative evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (general/imprecise objections can preserve error when correct ground obvious to judge and counsel)
- Hill v. State, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("catchall" objections may suffice under the circumstances to apprise the court of the basis for exclusion)
- Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (reasonable suspicion requires specific articulable facts, not a mere hunch)
- Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (three‑part test for admissibility of scientific evidence: valid theory, valid technique, proper application)
- Loesch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (reasonable‑suspicion assessment uses totality of circumstances)
- Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 1999) (administrative license suspension appeals reviewed under substantial evidence standard)
- Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2006) (questions of whether substantial evidence supports administrative findings are reviewed de novo by appellate courts)