Christopher Janson v. Katharyn B. Davis, LLC
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19894
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Landlord Morgan Linen hired Katharyn B. Davis, LLC to sue Christopher Janson in Missouri state court for unpaid rent and possession.
- Attorney Christopher Basler filed the complaint and a notarized affidavit stating Janson owed past-due rent and other charges; the affidavit was based on information from the landlord’s agent, not Basler’s personal knowledge.
- At the state-court trial Basler testified he lacked personal knowledge and that the firm’s practice is for the filing attorney to sign the affidavit. The state court entered judgment for the landlord.
- Janson sued the Davis firm in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging the affidavit attestation without personal knowledge was a false, deceptive, or unfair debt-collection practice (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f).
- The district court dismissed the FDCPA claims for failure to state a plausible claim; the dismissal was appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars this federal FDCPA suit | Janson: suit challenges affidavit practice, not the state judgment | Davis: federal suit effectively asks for review of state-court judgment | Court: Rooker–Feldman does not apply; plaintiff is not seeking federal review of the state judgment |
| Whether attesting to affidavit without personal knowledge violates § 1692e (false/deceptive practices) | Janson: swearing without personal knowledge is a false/misleading representation | Davis: affidavit’s substance (that debt existed) was not alleged false; practice not misleading | Court: No plausible allegation that the attestation misled an unsophisticated consumer or was materially misleading; §1692e claim fails |
| Whether practice violates § 1692f (unfair or unconscionable means) | Janson: attestation without knowledge is an unfair collection method | Davis: litigating in state court with evidence is not unfair | Court: Because there is no plausible showing of deception or unfair effect on the process, §1692f claim fails |
| Whether class claims survived dismissal | Janson: seeks class relief for those similarly sued | Davis: class claims depend on plausibly alleging FDCPA violations | Court: Class claims properly dismissed along with individual claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Banks v. Slay, 789 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2015) (explains Rooker–Feldman’s narrow scope)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (clarifies Rooker–Feldman focus)
- McIvor v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 773 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (motion-to-dismiss/pleading-standards)
- Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) (purpose of the FDCPA)
- Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsophisticated-consumer standard for FDCPA deception)
- Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2012) (no FDCPA liability where filings did not mislead or deceive)
- O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2011) (technical falsities in litigation filings do not violate FDCPA absent misleading effect)
- Gabriele v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., [citation="503 F. App'x 89"] (2d Cir. 2012) (court filings that are technically false but not misleading in adversary proceedings do not state FDCPA claims)