946 F.3d 304
6th Cir.2019Background
- Late-night (≈2:30 a.m.) March 16, 2013: Bey and two friends (all Black) drove a recently purchased van with a temporary tag to several stores and bought space heaters at a Canton Walmart.
- Livonia’s Special Operations Unit (SOU) — three plainclothes officers (McKinley, McAteer, Eisenbeis) — noticed the van, followed it across jurisdictions on a hunch (vehicle age, temporary tag), and conducted surveillance; McAteer followed the men inside Walmart and relayed observations by phone.
- McAteer observed the men pay at checkout (flipping through cards, then completing the purchase). SOU contacted Canton PD and requested a uniformed officer; Officer Falk arrived with a prep radio, waited outside, and, at McKinley’s direction, stopped Bey’s van as the men exited.
- Falk discovered Bey carried a firearm; Bey produced a concealed-carry license that had expired, leading to his arrest. In state court Bey’s motion to suppress succeeded; the criminal case was dismissed.
- Bey sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment unlawful stop; Fourteenth Amendment equal protection / racial profiling). District court denied defendants’ qualified immunity motions; on interlocutory appeal the Sixth Circuit (majority) affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment: Was the stop supported by reasonable suspicion? | Bey: No reasonable suspicion — officers only had vehicle age/temp tag/route; in-store conduct showed a lawful purchase. | McKinley et al.: Observations (old van, temporary/unreadable plate, interstate maneuver, surveillance) justified suspicion; stop was investigative. | McKinley: denial of immunity reversed as to Fourth Amendment (jury issue). McAteer, Eisenbeis: entitled to qualified immunity (no personal involvement in unconstitutional stop). Falk: entitled to qualified immunity (good-faith reliance/collective-knowledge). |
| Probable cause / traffic violation alternative basis for stop (unregistered vehicle) | Bey: No — record disputed whether plate run returned "no record" or was unreadable; genuine factual dispute. | Defendants: even if stop was for retail fraud, running plate/no-record provided independent basis to stop. | Court: factual dispute about registration search precluded resolving that theory on summary judgment — cannot grant immunity on that basis. |
| Personal involvement of SOU officers (McAteer, Eisenbeis) in the stop | Bey: They actively surveilled, relayed info, and participated in the chain that led to the stop. | Defs: Mere public surveillance and relaying observations do not make them liable; no direct role in ordering/executing stop. | Court: McAteer and Eisenbeis entitled to qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment (no personal involvement in unconstitutional stop). |
| Fourteenth Amendment: Equal protection (racial profiling / discriminatory intent) | Bey: Surveillance and stop were motivated by race; statistical and circumstantial evidence (disparate arrest rates, sequence of conduct) support discriminatory effect and intent. | Defs: No direct proof of racial animus; actions supported by nonracial investigative concerns; at most an unreasonable stop, not proof of discriminatory purpose. | Appeal re: McKinley’s equal protection challenge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (evidence-sufficiency factual issues). McAteer, Eisenbeis, Falk: qualified immunity granted as to equal protection (no sufficient individualized evidence of discriminatory intent for those officers). |
Key Cases Cited
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (per curiam) (qualified immunity attaches unless officer violated clearly established right)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity two-step; courts may address either prong first)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (limits interlocutory appeals of district factual findings in qualified-immunity denials)
- Hensley v. Rivera, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (collective-knowledge doctrine; reliance on other officers’ information)
- Arizona v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable-suspicion totality-of-circumstances; allow inferences from experience)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (subjective officer motivation irrelevant if objective justification exists)
- Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401 (6th Cir.) (good-faith reliance on other officers can bar liability where officer reasonably relied on trustworthy source)
- United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754 (6th Cir.) (collective knowledge imputed; responding officers may rely on others’ information)
- Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 610 (6th Cir.) (personal involvement required for individual liability)
- United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557 (6th Cir.) (observations in public and license-plate info not protected by Fourth Amendment)