Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee
2014 ME 72
| Me. | 2014Background
- Angell alleged sexual assaults by Hallee in early 1970s while she was a child; she turned 18 on November 16, 1979.
- The applicable limitations period for her tort claims was two years after reaching majority (expired November 16, 1981), unless tolled by defendant’s absence from Maine under 14 M.R.S. § 866.
- Hallee left Maine and moved to Massachusetts in 1977 and was living in Somerville on November 16, 1979; he worked for Lexington Public Schools and appeared on Somerville resident lists.
- Diocese records and contemporaneous newspaper reports identified Hallee and tracked his addresses; Diocese correspondence to Hallee in Somerville occurred during the 1980 limitation period.
- On initial pleadings the trial court entered judgment for Hallee; this Court vacated and remanded in 2012 for factual development on whether Hallee was “amenable to service.”
- On remand, summary-judgment evidence showed (undisputed) that Maine’s long-arm statute authorized service and that Angell, through reasonable efforts (including suing the Diocese and using discovery), could have located and served Hallee by means other than publication before November 16, 1981.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant’s residence outside Maine tolled the statute of limitations under § 866 | Tolling applied because Hallee resided outside Maine and was not amenable to service, extending limitations past Nov. 16, 1981 | No tolling because Hallee was amenable to service: Maine’s long-arm statute allowed service and he could have been found by reasonable effort | Held: No tolling — Hallee was amenable to service and limitations expired Nov. 16, 1981 |
| Whether Maine’s long-arm statute authorized service on Hallee in Massachusetts | N/A (disputed fact issue previously) | Long-arm authorized service for torts committed in Maine | Held: Long-arm statute did authorize service in Massachusetts |
| Whether a reasonable-effort standard would have permitted locating and serving Hallee (vs. requiring mere speculation) | Angell: she lacked Hallee’s full name and did not know how to locate him; Diocese might not have cooperated | Hallee: contemporaneous public records, newspapers, Diocese records, residence lists, and employment made him discoverable by reasonable effort | Held: Objective record shows Angell could have found and served Hallee by reasonable effort |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment after remand | Angell: factual disputes remain about discoverability and Diocese cooperation | Hallee: no genuine dispute of material fact; entitled to judgment as a matter of law | Held: Summary judgment affirmed for Hallee; statute of limitations barred the suit |
Key Cases Cited
- Angell v. Hallee, 36 A.3d 922 (Me. 2012) (prior decision defining “amenable to service” and remanding for factual development)
- Patten v. Milam, 480 A.2d 774 (Me. 1984) (court assesses whether defendant’s whereabouts were known or reasonably could have been known)
- Morrissette v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 837 A.2d 123 (Me. 2003) (legislative extension of limitations cannot revive an already-expired claim)
- Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814 (Me. 1980) (lengthening a statute of limitations does not change legal significance of past events)
- Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2014) (summary judgment standard)
- Estate of Lewis v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 87 A.3d 732 (Me. 2014) (de novo review of summary judgment)